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Abstract
This thesis investigates the effects of bank income diversifcation on bank
performance and systemic stability in three independent but complemen-
tary empirical studies:
The frst study reviews the Glass–Steagall Act and similar specialized
banking systems from a historic and macroeconomic perspective. The goal
is to assess whether past specialized banking systems were introduced for
fnancial stability concerns and whether such regimes entailed positive ef-
fects on fnancial stability. The historic analysis of ten countries that former-
ly had such regimes in place shows that such regulations were not primarily
motivated by fnancial stability. Based on a panel of thirty high-income juris-
dictions between 1970 and 2011 the study further provides an assessment of
the effects of such regimes on fnancial stability. The results do not support
the popular belief that specialized banking systems are associated with de-
creased crisis probability. The analysis instead yields limited evidence of
a positive relation. However, the results also indicate that specialized bank-
ing systems experience less severe banking crises than universal banking
regimes.
In contrast to the macro literature, a large body of empirical micro literat-
ure on the effects of bank income diversifcation exists. However, this liter-
ature provides mixed results. The second study therefore presents a meta-
regression analysis on this literature, including thirty-four studies with a
total of 932 regressions. The results indicate some evidence for underlying
genuine effects: Diversifcation is generally associated with reduced risk;
abstract vii
Specialized banking 
systems and financial
stability
Meta-analysis of
the literature on
bank diversification
this includes diversifcation from interest income towards fee income. Diver-
sifcation towards trading tends to increase proftability but decreases risk-
adjusted proftability. However, the clearest result is that the fndings of
existing studies crucially depend on research design. The discord in the
literature can partially be explained by studies not accounting for endogen-
eity, thus underestimating the riskiness of trading business. Furthermore,
studies focusing on countries that used to separate commercial banking
from investment banking tend to fnd a less positive relation between fee-
generating activities and proftability and a more positive relation between
trading and proftability. Also, samples with larger banks tend to yield more
positive effects from fee-generating and trading activities on profts.
The last study analyses the effects of income diversifcation on large
banks. The analysis is based on a panel of ninety large listed international
banks from 2005 to 2015. For additional details on banks’ income structure,
the data set combines information on fee and trading income, assets under
management, and investment banking deal volumes. The results indicate
that more diversifed large banks are generally less risky and more prof-
itable. The detailed analysis of individual bank activities indicates that fee
income outside investment banking and asset management (i.e. retail fees)
reduces the risk and increases the proftability of banks. The results further
provide some evidence that diversifcation towards trading and syndicated
loans underwriting decreases risk and increases proftability. In contrast,
equity underwriting increases risk and decreases proftability and risk-
adjusted proftability of banks.
In combination, these three studies do not support the hypothesis of spe-
cialized banking improving fnancial stability. Instead, the three studies give
a slight indication of universal banking improving the stability of individual
banks or the fnancial system. Overall, the results do not support limiting
the business model of universal banks by legally separating commercial
banking and investment banking.
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“And I tell you, sure as I am sitting here, that if banking institutions
are protected by the taxpayer and they are given free rein to speculate,
I may not live long enough to see the crisis, but my soul is going
to come back and haunt you.”
— Paul Volcker, Chairman of the President’s Economic Recovery
Advisory Board on 2 February 2010 to the United States Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
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c h a p t e r  o n e
1Introduction
This thesis investigates the effects of bank income diversifcation on bank
performance and systemic stability. The choice of topic is motivated by the
regulatory debate on the implications of universal banking on fnancial sta-
bility following the 2007 Global Financial Crisis: Soon after the start of the
crisis many policy makers and economists began to demand a separation of
commercial banking and investment banking activities (LaRouche Polit -
ical Action Committee 2018). The request was initially voiced in the
United States but later taken up in other jurisdictions. The rationale is that
risky investment banking business of systemically important banks may
have negative externalities on society. Proponents of such a regulation refer
to the former Glass–Steagall Act that largely separated commercial banks
and investment banks in the United States between 1934 and 1999. It is ar-
gued that this separation bolstered fnancial stability for the time it was in
place. Therefore, this historic American regulation should serve as a model
for a policy response to the Global Financial Crisis. In recent years, sever-
al jurisdictions adapted more restrained structural regulations that were
partially inspired by the historic American model (Gambacorta and van
Rixtel 2013; Viñals et al. 2013; fsb 2014). However, the controversy on re-
instating Glass–Steagall or instating similar specialized banking systems has
never fully abated.
Surprisingly, a closer examination of the literature shows that this debate
is based on limited and contradicting empirical grounds. The empirical
macro literature on the determinants of banking crises ignores the potential
introduction 1
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infuence of specialized banking systems. In contrast, there is an extensive
body of empirical micro literature dealing with the relevance of specializa-
tion or diversifcation on the performance of banks. However, this strand of
literature yields mixed results. In addition, the literature neglects the relev-
ant nexus to systemic stability by mostly analysing small and medium-sized
banks. Analysing diversifcation of such banks may be relevant from a busi-
ness perspective but not necessarily for systemic stability and thus for regu-
lation. Regulatory measures can only be justifed by stability concerns if the
poor performance of such banks generates societal externalities. Such ex-
ternalities are more likely to occur amongst large banks.
This thesis investigates the implicit hypothesis of the post-crisis debate
according to which specialized banking is preferable to universal banking
from a fnancial stability perspective. The focus lies on three aspects that
have thus far been neglected in the relevant empirical literature: the macro
effects on systemic stability, the mixed results in the existing micro litera-
ture, and the lack of relevant fndings on large and systemically important
banks.
1.1 theoretical background on bank income diversification
In addition to the mixed results on the effects of bank diversifcation in the
empirical literature, theoretical expectations for such effects are also am-
biguous. This section provides an overview of the major theoretical argu-
ments on this issue.
1.1.1 Individual bank activities and related risks
As a frst step to understanding the implications of income diversifcation,
this section individually describes the income streams and risk profles of
different banking activities.
From a risk perspective, the most fundamental categorization of bank in-
come is based on the bank’s role as either principal or agent (Saunders
and Walter 1994, 167–179). If a bank makes investments on its own
accounts, it acts as principal. Principal activities generate interest income,
2 introduction
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dividend income and gains from asset price movements. If a bank provides
services to clients in exchange for fees or commissions, it acts as an agent for
its clients. The categorization of principal and agent risks suggests that
banks bear higher risks when acting as principals in comparison to when
acting as agents: In a bad state of business, a principal may lose all or part of
the initially invested amount and earn a negative return. In contrast, an
agent should at worst only lose its fee income and earn a zero return.
Both, commercial banking and investment banking can entail principal
and agency risk. Commercial banks mainly take on principal risks in their
traditional business, when giving out mortgage and commercial loans. In
asset management, in contrast, commercial banks act as their clients’
 agents. Investment banks take on principal risk when engaging in propri-
etary trading and in securities underwriting on a frm-commitment basis
(i.e. the bank takes new issues on its books at an agreed price and places
them in the market on its own accounts). Other typical investment banking
activities are mostly associated with agency risk. Investment banks tradi-
tionally take on agency risks through fee generating activities such as trad-
ing on behalf of clients (i.e. brokerage), mergers and acquisition services,
and best-efforts securities underwriting (i.e. the bank does not take on in-
ventory positions). According to this categorization in principal and agent
risks, and contrary to widespread belief, fee-based investment banking
activities should be less risky than traditional banking business.
However, DeYoung and Roland (2001, 81) note that fee-based activities
are associated with relatively high fxed-costs for staff and information tech-
nology. Owing to this operational leverage in combination with low switch-
ing costs for customers, fee-generating activities may be more risky than the
traditional lending business. In addition, some fee-based activities may
tempt banks to increase their unweighted fnancial leverage, because these
activities tie up only little risk-weighted capital (DeYoung and Roland
2001, 56–57). It is thus not a priori clear whether principal or agent business
is riskier.
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1.1.2 Theoretical benefits from income diversification
Knowing the riskiness of individual non-interest banking activities is not
sufficient to assess the effects of combining such activities with traditional
banking business. This becomes clear if we look at different business lines of
a universal bank as individual assets in an investment portfolio. Portfolio
theory suggests that a bank’s risk is a function of the return variances of the
individual assets or business lines and the correlation coefficients between
each possible pair of business lines:
(1.1)
where  is the portfolio return variance,  is the weight of each business
line i in terms of invested capital,  is each business line’s standard devi-
ation of returns and  is the correlation coefficient between each possible
pair of business lines i and j. If business line returns are negatively corre-
lated, the second term of the formula becomes smaller. At some point, the
second term cancels out the frst term and the portfolio risk becomes zero.
So, from a portfolio theory point of view, even if investment banking
activities were riskier than commercial banking on a stand-alone basis, a
commercial bank could reduce its overall risk or improve its risk-adjusted
proftability through diversifcation if the incomes from investment and com-
mercial banking were weakly or negatively correlated. Diversifcation of a
commercial bank into investment banking would thus only increase risk,
if the risks of the two business lines were highly correlated and the invest-
ment banking activities were sufficiently riskier than commercial banking
(Saunders and Walter 1994, 183–184).
Portfolio theory further implies that, by diversifying into a riskier activity,
overall risk increases linearly only if the returns of the new activity are per-
fectly positively correlated with the returns of the bank’s other activities. If
the correlation coefficient of the returns are between perfectly negative and
perfectly positive, a non-linear, quadratic relation results between the pro-
portion of investment bank activities and overall risk, as illustrated in f-
gure 1.1. With a perfectly negative correlation, the relation becomes kinked.
4 introduction
Risk dependent on
correlation of returns
Portfolio efect
reduces risk
In addition to portfolio effects, more diversifed banks might beneft from
economies of scope. Universal banks could beneft from cross-selling oppor-
tunities. Such banks could use information gained on customers from one
line of business to provide other services at lower client acquisition or infor-
mation costs (Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2010, 627).
1.1.3 Theoretical vulnerabilities of universal banks
Other theoretical considerations favour bank specialization over diversifca-
tion. The literature states several theoretical arguments that could explain
more diversifed banks having higher risks or lower returns.
De Nicoló et al. (2004, 201) argue that banks do not necessarily diversify
to reduce risk but could instead do so to use the improved stability from
theoretical background on bank income diversification 5
Figure 1.1   Two assets portfolio. If returns of the new activity B are perfectly 
positively correlated with the returns of the firm’s prior activity A, overall risk 
increases linearly with the share of activity B. If the correlation is between per-
fectly positive and perfectly negative, a non-linear, quadratic relation results. 
With a perfectly negative correlation the relation becomes kinked.
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diversifcation benefts to take on more risk within business lines and in-
crease proftability. If bank risk is associated with negative externalities,
bank managers might – in their pursuit of higher profts – choose a risk level
that is too high from a societal perspective.
For Myers and Rajan (1998, 763) bank diversifcation may be driven by
misaligned incentives between shareholders and managers of banks. Man-
agers may have incentives to build empires or increase risk in expectation of
higher bonuses. Managers could even expand into more liquid trading activ-
ities to enhance their opportunities to trade against the bank’s interests.
Colvin (1998, 26) argues that universal banks could be more risky be-
cause they are more susceptible to gambling for resurrection. A bank that
owns shares in a client frm might be tempted to provide further credit fn-
ancing even if this frm is in distress. In hope of recovering its initial invest-
ment, a bank might pour good money after bad.
Colvin (1998, 25–26) further considers universal banks to be riskier be-
cause they have, in comparison to specialized institutions, a bigger maturity
mismatch between assets and liabilities. In contrast, specialized investment
banks may provide equally long-term loans but are not fnanced by short-
term deposits. At the same time, specialized commercial banks are less vul-
nerable to bank runs, because they do not invest in long-term commercial
loans.
Boot and Thakor (1997) explain in a formalized theoretical model that
universal banking systems are less efficient than specialized banking sys-
tems because of lower fnancial innovation. The reason is that investment
banks aim to lower their clients’ costs of capital by broadening the market
for their securities through fnancial innovation. This fnancial innovation
makes capital market fnancing more attractive to borrowers who would oth-
erwise rely on debt fnancing by commercial banks. If investment banks and
commercial banks are combined to form universal banks, investment bank-
ing departments would consider the adverse effect of their fnancial innova-
tions on their commercial banking departments. Especially in markets with
imperfect competition between banks, this would result in a lower overall
level of fnancial innovation and scarcer fnancing for the economy. Func-
tionally specialized banks would be driven out of the market by universal
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banks that proft from economies of scope. Internationally, however, invest-
ment banks from specialized banking systems would have a competitive
edge over the investment banking arms of universal banks because of in-
creased innovation.
Several theoretical arguments against universal banks put forward in the
literature emphasize an increased moral hazard because of implicit govern-
ment guarantees (e.g. Benston 1994, 123–124). The rationale is that uni-
versal banks tend to be larger than specialized banks. Such arguments thus
address the issue of diversifcation versus specialization only indirectly. In
addition, the Global Financial Crisis has demonstrated that specialized in-
vestment banks can be sufficiently large to be systemically important.
1.2 structure of this thesis
This thesis is structured into three independent but complementary empir-
ical studies. Each study approaches the issue of universal banking versus
specialized banking and of bank diversifcation versus specialization from a
different angle. These three studies form the subsequent chapters 2 to 4.
Chapter 2 reviews the Glass–Steagall Act and similar specialized banking
systems from a historic and macroeconomic perspective. The goal is to as-
sess whether past specialized banking systems were introduced for fnancial
stability concerns and whether such regimes entailed positive effects on fn-
ancial stability. In this study, high-income countries are categorized as uni-
versal banking or specialized banking systems over an extended period for
the frst time in the literature. The study is the frst to empirically assess the
relevance of specialized or universal banking systems as determinants of fn-
ancial crises. This assessment is based on a panel of thirty high-income
countries between 1970 and 2011.
Chapter 3 presents a meta-regression analysis on the micro literature on
bank diversifcation, including thirty-four studies with a total of 932 regres-
sions. This study is one of very few meta-regression analyses in the feld
of banking and the frst one to address the issue of bank diversifcation.
The study identifes underlying genuine effects of diversifcation on bank
performance common to most existing studies. In addition, the analysis
structure of this thesis 7
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explains observed differences in the fndings across different empirical stud-
ies on this topic.
Chapter 4 analyses the effects of income diversifcation on large interna-
tional banks. The analysis is based on a panel of 90 large listed international
banks from 2005 to 2015 and includes more granular income data than exist-
ing studies on international banks. The data thus allow measuring diversifc-
ation between commercial banking and investment banking activities in
greater detail.
Chapter 5 provides an overall summary and identifes possible policy im-
plications. The chapter acknowledges the limitations of the presented work
and highlights potentially fruitful avenues for future research.
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2Specialized Banking Systems
and Financial Stability
The 2007 Global Financial Crisis internationally triggered policy discussions
on structurally separating commercial banks from their investment banking
activities. Examples of such policy initiatives include the Volcker Rule as part
of the American Dodd–Frank Act, the reform in the European Union based
on the Liikanen Report and the British reform based on the recommenda-
tions of the Vickers commission. All these initiatives entailed some degree
of separation between commercial banking and securities activities banking
(Lehmann 2016).
The policy discussion was, to a large extent, inspired by the American
Glass–Steagall Act (Uchitelle 2009). This act came into force in 1934 as
a reaction to the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. The
act prohibited American commercial banks from conducting most securities
activities and securities frms from taking deposits (Benston 1990, 7). Fin-
ancial institutions were thus forced to specialize either on commercial bank-
ing or securities business. This specialized banking system was gradually
relaxed in the 80s and 90s and eventually abolished in 1999 (Markham
2002, 299–302).
The effectiveness of separating banking and securities business to improve
fnancial stability appears to be generally accepted in the policy debate
after the Global Financial Crisis. However, while a large body of empirical
literature on the effects of specialized banking systems exists, the results are
contradictory. Most existing studies analyse the stability effects that the
combining or separating of commercial banking and securities activities has
specialized banking systems and financial stability 9
The model of the 
Glass–Steagall Act
Mixed results from 
bank-level studies
on individual institutes.1 An early strand of the literature analyses the co-
variances in income of commercial banks and other fnancial frms (e.g.
 Johnson and Meinster 1974; Boyd, Graham and Hewitt 1993). Later
contributions include event studies of mergers between banks and securities
frms (DeLong 2001; Filson and Olfati 2014) or of deregulation steps
(e.g. Bhargava and fraser 1998; Cornett, Ors and Tehranian 2002).
The largest group of studies, however, includes econometric comparisons of
banks with different degrees of involvement in securities business or other
non-traditional activities (e.g. Kwast 1989; demirgüç-kunt and Huizinga
2010). Other studies do not explicitly analyse the effects of specialized bank-
ing systems but instead analyse the optimal degree of bank activity diversi-
fcation independently from regulatory restrictions. The existing literature
gives an inconsistent verdict on the desirability of specialized or universal
banking systems from a fnancial stability perspective.
The aforementioned studies analyse the effects of securities activities on
individual institutes. The alternative is a macro-level analysis of the effects
from specialized banking systems on the probability and severity of bank-
ing crises. The existing literature on the determinants of banking crises ana-
lyses various crisis determinants but does not focus on the existence of
specialized banking systems as a possible infuence. Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (1998) fnd that low growth, high infation and high real
interest rates are associated with systemic banking sector problems.
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) observe the presence of de-
posit insurance schemes to increase crisis probability. Beck, Demirgüç -
Kunt and Levine (2006) fnd that more concentrated banking sectors
are more stable.  Joyce (2011) fnds, for emerging economies, that more
liberal capital regimes reduce the probability of banking crises, while
fxed exchange rate regimes have the opposite effect. Reinhart and
Rogoff (2014) show that increased credit growth increases crisis probabil-
ity. Most closely related to our topic of interest, Demirgüç-Kunt and
1 Another strand of the literature including Kroszner and Rajan (1994) and 
Drucker and Puri (2005) focuses on implications of universal banking
on service quality, rather than on financial stability.
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Detragiache (1998) and Iftikhar (2015) fnd that fnancial liberaliza-
tion is associated with increased fnancial fragility.2
The fame of Glass–Steagall may create the wrong impression that this
American regulatory experience was unique and that country comparisons
would thus be unfeasible. This is, however, not the case. Several countries
had similar restrictions on banks’ securities activities in place. But, to my
knowledge, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) contribute the
only macro study that partially addresses the effect of specialized banking
systems on fnancial stability: They include restrictions on banks’ securities
activities as a control variable in one single model specifcation. The control
variable yields a positive effect on crisis probability. However, the authors
do not discuss the result for this variable. Also, the stated data source for
that study only captures specialized banking systems that still existed after
1998. The authors thus seem to incorrectly identify regimes that had been
changed to universal banking in sample years before 1998. Also, since the
observation period of that pooled regression analysis stretches from 1980 to
1997, the variable on activity restrictions seems to be time-invariant.
The present study assesses whether the Glass–Steagall Act and other his-
toric specialized banking systems can serve as a model to improve fnancial
stability. To do this, I initially conduct a qualitative historic analysis on the
relevance of fnancial stability motives when such specialized banking sys-
tems were introduced. I compile a comprehensive dataset on specialized
banking systems in high-income countries (and non-sovereign jurisdictions)
after 1929. In addition to whether specialized banking systems were moti-
vated by stability concerns, I analyse if such regimes actually had an empir-
ical effect on fnancial stability. The popular belief that specialized banking
regimes increase fnancial stability by limiting crisis prevalence and severity
serves as the main hypothesis for this study. I thus use the compiled data for
a macro-level analysis of the effects of specialized banking systems on the
probability and severity of banking crises. The quantitative analysis is based
on a panel of thirty high-income countries between 1970 and 2011.
2 Papi, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2015, 39) provide an overview on the 
literature.
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The historic analysis considerably qualifes the relevance of fnancial sta-
bility considerations as a political motive for past specialized banking sys-
tems. The literature states fnancial stability motives only for three out of
ten observed specialized banking countries: the United States, Belgium and
Italy. However, for all three cases the literature presents alternative ex-plana-
tions that raise questions about the sincerity of the fnancial stability motive.
Regarding the quantitative analysis, I fnd no evidence that specialized
banking systems lead to fewer banking crises. Limited evidence even sug-
gests that specialized banking systems are associated with increased crisis
probability, contrary to popular belief. However, the results also indicate
that specialized banking systems experience less severe banking crises.
2.1 questionable stability motive of historic regulations
This section reviews the motives for the introduction of historic activity re-
strictions on banks’ securities business based on the economic, historic and
legal literature. After the Global Financial Crisis of 2007, the policy dis-
cussion referred to the Glass–Steagall Act introduced in the United States
in 1934 (Uchitelle 2009). The reference implies that this historic sepa-
ration of commercial and investment banking was motivated by fnancial
stability concerns. However, the analysis of the historic motives for this act
and similar activity restrictions in other countries raises doubts about this
motivation.
To fnd comparable specialized banking systems, I examine a group of
thirty high-income countries. For each country I check whether it had such a
regulation in place between 1929 and 2011. The Bank Regulation and Super-
vision database serves as a starting point (World Bank 2012). Among other
things, this database contains information on activity restrictions for banks.
The information is based on surveys conducted in irregular intervals since
1998. The last available update was conducted in 2012. The surveys cover a
varying sample of 118 to 143 countries, including all high-income countries
in the sample of this study.  Japan, Taiwan and the United States are report-
ed to have had specialized banking systems in place during the covered
period. To check for earlier specialized banking systems in other countries, I
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search the literature for information on activity restrictions or the presence
of universal banks. I initially focus on the period between the Great Depres-
sion after 1929 and the start of the era of fnancial liberalization in 1970. If
I fnd evidence for universal banking activities in a country during this
period, I assume that a universal banking regime was maintained until after
the Global Financial Crisis. If I fnd evidence for regulatory restrictions on
banks’ securities activities, I search the literature to pinpoint the year these
restrictions were abolished. I identify ten countries that had specialized
banking systems in place: Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, France, Italy,
 Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the United States. These countries abol-
ished the restrictions between 1981 and 2001. Table 2.7 in this chapter’s ap-
pendix lists the individual sources and periods for each country.
In the following subsections I analyse these ten countries in greater detail.
I focus on the political motivation for introducing such regimes and whether
fnancial stability reasons were important. The focus does not lie on legal
differences that existed between the discussed regimes.
2.1.1 United States as model for specialized banking
The United States Banking Act of 1933 was the main historic reference
point for post-2007 discussions on separating investment and commercial
banking. Dubbed the Glass–Steagall Act, this piece of legislation established
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, outlawed interest payments on
checking accounts and regulated other aspects of banking (Federal Re -
serve Bank of New York 1933). Sections 16, 20 and 32 of the Act largely
prohibited commercial banks from underwriting, holding and dealing in cor-
porate securities, both directly and through subsidiaries. Also, involvement
of commercial bank staff and directors in securities frms was prohibited. In
return, Section 21 prohibited securities frms from accepting deposits. These
rules established a high degree of separation between the deposit fnanced
loan business of commercial banks and the securities business of investment
banks (Kroszner and Rajan 1994).
An initially plausible explanation as to why American lawmakers took this
measure can be taken from the congressional hearings conducted after the
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crash of 1929. The way the United States Senate (1933, 7) described the
consequences of the crash amounts to a textbook defnition of systemic bank-
ing crisis:
“The wholesale closing of banks and other fnancial institutions; the loss
of deposits and savings; the drastic curtailment of credit; the inability of
debtors to meet their obligations; the growth of unemployment; the di-
minution of the purchasing power of the people to the point where in-
dustry and commerce were prostrated; and the increase in bankruptcy,
poverty, and distress – all these conditions must be considered in some
measure when the ultimate cost to the American public of speculating
on the securities exchanges is computed.”
This report thus suggests stability concerns as a main motive for the regula-
tion. However, some authors contest the sincerity of this motive. Edwards
(1942, 225) criticizes that the commission did not base its conclusions on a
statistical analysis of specialized investment banks and securities affiliates of
commercial banks. Benston (1990, 220–221) explains the political support
for the act with senator Glass’ preconceptions about the hazardousness of
universal banking. The later sponsor of the Banking Act had warned about
the dangers of market speculation throughout the 1920s and believed that
recent regulatory changes further encouraged such behaviour (Orbe 1983,
165). His beliefs led the infuential senator to misstate the fndings from
the hearings. Self-interest of specialized commercial banks generated fur-
ther support for the bill (Benston 1990, 220–222). Tabarrok (1998) em-
phasizes the support of the Rockefeller family and their National City Bank
(later named Citibank) to instate a strict separation of commercial and in-
vestment banking to damage its rival  J.P. Morgan. As a result of the Glass–
Stegall Act,  J.P. Morgan had to spin off its investment banking business,
which became Morgan Stanley.
Tabarrok (1998, 7) also describes that an angry American public deman-
ded some action be taken. A resolute legislative response to the crash of 1929
was a major element of the democratic campaign in the election year of 1932
(Benston 1990, 219). Directing this actionism against universal banking
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seems like an unsurprising choice. Most commercial banks had only started
to develop their securities businesses since the First World War. And only
since 1927 the McFadden Act had formally recognized the expansion of com-
mercial banks into investment banking (Rahman 2012, 616–617). Accord-
ingly, returning to a system with specialized institutions accommodated a
longing for the good old days. In addition, such a fnancial system corres-
ponded to the model provided by Britain, the world’s major power of that
time. The United States Senate (1933, 334, 339) refers multiple times to
the British system. The separation of commercial and investment banking in
the United States thus appears more as the result of political actionism than
of economic deliberation.
The Glass–Stagall Act was eroded in multiple steps beginning 1986 and
eventually abolished with the passage of the Gram–Leach–Bliley Act in 1999
(Cyree 2000, 344; Filson and Olfati 2014, 209–210). Barth, Brum -
baugh and Wilcox (2000, 192, 200) state other countries’ experience with
universal banking, increasing global competition and technological progress
facilitating cross-selling as reasons for this development.
2.1.2 Belgium and Italy follow suit
Belgium presents an interesting case on specialized banking regulation.
Belgium was the frst country in which universal banks evolved in the
nineteenth century. Additionally, the Belgian banks were in many aspects
more prototypically universal than their much-discussed German neigh-
bours (Ugolini 2010, 7–8). However, after the crash of 1929 and soon after
the United States, Belgium took regulatory measures to enforce a division of
labour in banking (Weber 1938, 9). The royal decree of 23 August 1934
mandated a separation of banking functions. The banques mixtes were sep-
arated in banques de dépôt and sociétés de portefeuille. The banques de dépôt
were restricted to deposit taking and short-term lending while the sociétés
de portefeuille were barred from deposit taking (Cassiers et al. 1998, 126).
As in the case of the United States, the authorities stated crisis prevention
as a main reason for the new regulation (Banque Nationale de Bel -
gique 1934, 83). The Belgian reform took place shortly after the enactment
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of Glass–Steagall, the creation of which the Belgian authorities closely fol-
lowed (Banque Nationale de Belgique 1933, 81–83). The Banque
Nationale de Belgique (1934, 83) explicitly referred to the American
model when announcing the new regulation. However, it was not fnan-
cial stability reasons that led the Belgians to follow the American model.
Giddey (2014, 1222–1224) reports that the separation of banking and securit-
ies business was added at the last minute to a broader legislative project at
the request of major banks. The motive for this lobbying feat was to have the
non-depository parts of former universal banks remain out of the scope of
the newly instituted banking supervision.
In Italy, the frst big banks developed as universal banks in the late nine-
teenth century (Weber 1938, 14–15). As a reaction to the crash of 1929, the
Great Depression and major bank failures, fascist Italy enacted the Bank-
ing Act of 1936. The act separated the responsibilities of the banking system
and the securities markets and stipulated a specialized banking system (La
Francesca 2011, 121–123). Banks could neither underwrite shareholdings
in industrial companies nor could they be controlled by them (Vozzella,
Gabbi and Matthias 2015, 15).
Draghi (1992, 392) and La Francesca (2011, 122) see fnancial stability
concerns as the main driver for the introduction of this regime. However, as
in the cases of the United States and Belgium, the sincerity of this motive is
questionable. Forsyth (1991, 201) regards the authorities’ desire for control
over the credit system and a long-standing confict with the banks’ manage-
ments as decisive grounds for the reform.
Belgium and Italy both switched to universal banking regimes in 1993
when the two countries implemented directive 92/481 of the European
Union (La Francesca 2011, 146). Following this directive, all member
countries of the European Union adopted a wide defnition of banking activ-
ities, inspired by German universal banking, to allow for the European
single market (Cassiers et al. 1998, 150).
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2.1.3 American influence on Japanese and Taiwanese regulation
The American infuence on  Japanese and Taiwanese banking regimes was
so direct that fnancial stability considerations can be ruled out as motives.
In 1948, American occupation authorities dismantled  Japan’s dominant in-
dustrial groups, the zaibatsu, to limit their infuence on post-war  Japan. To
prevent the former zaibatsu banks from conducting securities business, the
occupation authorities implemented a Glass–Steagall regime (Patrikis
1998, 580).  Japan liberalized its banking sector in 1999 in an attempt to
render it more internationally competitive. This liberalization entailed the
abolishment of the separation between banking and securities business (Pat-
rikis 1998, 583; Flath 2005, 266, 293).
In Taiwan, after the Chinese civil war, the Kuomintang regime was highly
dependent on American aid and technical assistance. To contain commun-
ism, such aid and assistance led to strong and institutionalized American in-
fuence. For example, the Taiwanese Economic Stabilization Board held its
deliberations in English, with American officials participating as de facto full
members. Based on American suggestions, Taiwan implemented a package
of economic reforms (Haggard and Zheng 2013, 441–446). In 1968 Taiwan
enacted its Securities and Exchange Act modelled after the American and
 Japanese legislation (Ong 2009, 4). The specialized banking system was ab-
olished in 2001 when Taiwan liberalized its banking industry (Huang and
Lin 2011, 2–3).
2.1.4 Natural evolution in Britain, its Dominions and France
The Glass–Steagall Act has been a popular subject in the economic literature
since the period of fnancial liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s. This fame
of Glass–Steagall obscures the fact that the British fnancial system special-
ized long before and had served as the standard counterexample to univer-
sal banking during the early twentieth century (Weber 1938).
The British system of specialized banking was based on a complex mixture
of statutory and self-regulatory provisions (Pimlott 1985, 142). Clearing
banks were the equivalent to commercial banks in today’s terms. They were
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focused on the provision of payment services, deposit-taking activities and
short-term corporate lending (Davies et al. 2010, 322). The non-clearing
banks comprised of members of the Accepting Houses’ Committee that were
mainly active in the business of accepting and guaranteeing commercial
bills (Grady and Weale 1986, 4, 36). These merchant banks provided
trade fnance, a limited volume of lending, fund management and conduc-
ted corporate fnance business. They served as underwriter and priced and
placed issues in combination with separate brokers (Bowen, Hoggarth
and Pain 1999, 280). Also, at the London Stock Exchange, a division of la-
bour developed in the nineteenth century. Brokers acted only as agents for
their clients while so-called jobbers acted as market makers and could not
deal directly with the investing public (McMahon 1984, 47).
The specialization in British banking was largely non-statutory, evolved
through distinct self-regulating clubs or associations and was encouraged by
the Bank of England (Peeters 1988, 371). Thomas (2004, 117–118) argues
that this specialization was the result of rationalization and served as a
defensive reaction to the increasing complexity of fnance. D’Have and
Quentyn (1987, 98) regard the self-interests of an oligopolistic banking
cartel as the reason for the development of this division of labour. With re-
gard to the division of labour at the stock exchange, Neal and Davis (2006)
sees path-dependency in combination with the initial membership structure
as crucial.
In summary, there is no evidence suggesting the specialized banking sys-
tem in Britain was deliberately implemented to safeguard fnancial stability.
Such a motive even seems implausible as the specialization evolved over
time and as a result of interacting stakeholders, rather than a centralized
decision. The specialization requirement between banking and securities
business was lifted in the course of the big bang liberalization of 1986 (Hebb
and Fraser 2003, 82–83).
Similar specialized systems had evolved in the British Dominions, al-
though not because of interference by the homeland. As in Britain, there
is no evidence that the development of specialized banking systems in the
Dominions was driven by fnancial stability concerns. Canadian banks were
restricted in their involvement in the securities industry by custom and
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tradition (Hebb and Fraser 2002, 1937). Securities dealers were involved
with the underwriting and selling of bond and stock issues under a legis-
lative framework established by provincial governments (Freedman 1992,
373). Universal banking became permissible with the Banking Act of 1987
(Hebb and Fraser 2002, 1938). In Australia, Edey and Gray (1996, 7)
argue that a division of labour between banking and securities business
evolved naturally and that competition across the two sectors was limited.
Banking controls implemented to counter infation during the Second World
War formally established this segmentation. The controls were maintained
after the war and constrained bank lending. As a result, an increasing pro-
portion of corporate investment was intermediated through non-bank fnan-
cial institutions and fnanced through the issuance of bonds (Black et al.
2012, 7–10). The distinction between so called trading banks and savings
banks was removed in 1988 (Battellino and McMillan 1989, 28). Sim-
ilar to Australia, New Zealand introduced monetary controls during the
Second World War. These measures included, among other things, the regu-
lation of asset portfolios (Hunt 2009, 34). Owing to stock exchange regula-
tions, banks were also prohibited to incorporate stockbrokers (Davis 1998,
21). These regulations were liberalized in 1986 (Tanndal and Walden -
ström 2016, 56).
Also in France, some degree of specialization in the banking system de-
veloped right up to the First World War, initially without explicit regulatory
guidance. Denizet (1970, 450) explains the division of labour between
banques d’affaires and banques de dépôts simply with tradition. Brambilla
(2010, 103, 106) explains this development with the importance of Paris
as an international fnancial centre. Paris had a comparatively deep and
liquid securities market that lessened needs for banks’ direct industrial
investments. While Denizet (1970, 450) regards specialization in interwar
France as comparable to Britain, Weber (1938, 11) describes it as mid-
dle ground between specialized and universal banking. However, in 1941
Vichy France implemented a statutory and stricter specialization (Gourio
1984, 6). Also for this case, fnancial stability concerns do not seem to have
been the driver of bank activity restrictions. Bouvier (1973, 186) judges
this reform to be more politically than economically motivated. France
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abandoned its specialized banking system in 1984 for competitiveness rea-
sons, during a period of international liberalization (Gourio 1984, 6–7).
2.2 data
The econometric analysis aims to determine the effects of specialized bank-
ing systems on fnancial stability. I therefore collect data on banking crises
and specialized banking systems for a macro panel of high-income coun-
tries. This data is complemented by an array of control variables commonly
used in the empirical literature on the determinants of banking crises.
2.2.1 Country sample
The sample includes thirty countries (and non-sovereign jurisdictions) with
1196 yearly observations from 1970 to 2011. I include countries that qualify
as high-income according to the World Bank’s World Development Indicat-
ors database since 2000 or prior. I exclude countries with populations below
a hundred thousand and non-sovereign jurisdictions with populations below
one million because available information on banking crises appears incom-
plete (e.g. Bermuda,  Liechtenstein, Macau, Monaco). I further exclude
member countries of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation because Is-
lamic banking systems differ fundamentally from conventional banking sys-
tems.
Table 2.1 lists all included countries, the years when specialized banking
systems were in place and the years when banking crises were observed.
Owing to missing data, some countries are not included for the entire
sample period.
2.2.2 Prevalence and severity of banking crises
I use multiple separate dependent variables to analyse the impact of special-
ized banking systems on the prevalence and severity of banking crises.
Crisis prevalence is a dummy variable that indicates the presence of bank-
ing crises for each country and year. Crisis years are compiled from the exist-
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ing literature on banking crises. Table 2.1 lists all identifed crisis episodes
per country. There is a total of 160 crisis years spread over ffty-one crisis
episodes. Figure 2.1 shows the yearly number of countries in crisis over the
sample period.
Crisis severity, crisis depth and crisis duration are constructed according to
the severity index of Reinhart and Rogoff (2014, 51). Crisis depth is
defned as the absolute value of the maximum percentage decline in real
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Table 2.1   Included countries and banking crises
Country Sample years Specialized banking Banking crises
Australia 1970–2011 1970–1988 1989–1991
Austria 1970–2011 2008–2010
Belgium 1970–2011 1970–1983 2008–2009
Canada 1970–2011 1970–1987 1983–1985
Cyprus 1987–2011 2000–2001, 2009–2011
Denmark 1970–2011 1987–1992, 2008–2009
Finland 1970–2011 1991–1994
France 1970–2011 1970–1984 1991–1995, 2008–2010
Germany 1970–2011 1974–1975, 2008–2010
Greece 1995–2011 2008–2011
Hong Kong 1990–2011 1998–1999
Iceland 1970–2011 1985, 1993, 2007–2011
Ireland 1970–2011 1985, 2007–2011
Israel 1970–2011 1977–1978, 1983–1985
Italy 1970–2011 1970–1994 1991–1993, 2008–2011
Japan 1970–2011 1970–1999 1992–1999
Luxembourg 1990–2011 2008–2011
Netherlands 1970–2011 1975, 2008–2011
New Zealand 1970–2010 1970–1986 1987–1990
Norway 1970–2011 1987–1989, 2008–2011
Portugal 1993–2011 2008–2009
Singapore 1970–2011 1982–1983
Slovenia 1995–2011 2008–2011
South Korea 1971–2011 1980, 1997–1998
Spain 1970–2011 1977, 1980–1987, 2008–2011
Sweden 1970–2011 1990–1994, 2008–2010
Switzerland 1970–2011 1991–1993, 2008–2010
Taiwan 1977–2011 1970–2001 1983, 1995
United Kingdom 1970–2011 1970–1986 1973–1976, 1981–1982, 1991–1992, 2007–2011
United States 1970–2011 1970–1999 1984, 2007–2011
gdp per capita during a crisis, based on gdp and population data from the
Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015). There is some
discretion in choosing the exact reference point for this decline because the
sources only state the starting year of each crisis and not a specifc start-
ing day. If the initial crisis year already exhibits a decline in real gdp per
capita, crisis depth describes the maximum decline relative to the year pre-
ceding the beginning of the crisis. If the downturn starts later, the variable
describes the maximum decline relative to the initial crisis year. Crisis dura-
tion is defned as the number of years it takes for real gdp per capita to
recover to pre-crisis level. If no decline in gdp per capita is observed for a
crisis episode, the duration is based on the crisis years stated in the sources
for crisis prevalence. Any renewed downturn is considered part of the same
crisis if the second downturn takes place before the economy has reached its
prior peak. For countries that were still in a crisis in 2011, I consider gdp de-
velopment beyond the end of the sample period. The available gdp data
from Penn World Table stretches until 2014. For countries still in crisis in that
year, I estimate crisis duration based on reported and estimated growth rates
for the years after 2014 (imf 2017a; 2017b).3 Crisis severity is constructed by
simply adding the two components crisis depth and crisis duration.
3 These countries are Cyprus, Greece, Iceland, Italy and Spain.
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Figure 2.1   Number of sample countries in banking crises over time
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2.2.3 Specialized banking
The variable of interest for this analysis is specialized banking. This dummy
variable is derived from the historical analysis in section 2.1. The variable
indicates years during which a country had regulations in place that re-
stricted banks’ securities business, similar to the American Glass–Steagall
Act.
2.2.4 Control variables
I include several control variables that are correlated with my dependent
variables and my variable of interest so that their omission could bias the
estimated coefficient of the variable of interest. I also include controls that
are uncorrelated with the variable of interest and serve to increase the pre-
cision of the estimate. The included controls are commonly applied in the
existing literature on crisis determinants (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detra -
giache 1998; 2002; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 2006;  Joyce
2011; Gourinchas and Obstfeld 2012).
Output gap is constructed as the percentage deviation of output-side real
gdp from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. Output gap is not signifcantly correl-
ated to the variable of interest and its omission would thus not bias the es-
timate. However, the variable captures macroeconomic shocks that can be
a major driver of banking crises by increasing the share of non-performing
loans. Output gap is thus included to reduce the error variance and increase
the precision of the estimate (Wooldridge 2008, 205). Based on the fnd-
ings of Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) we can expect output gap to be
positively correlated with crisis prevalence and crisis severity.
Inflation measures the annual percentage change in price level in local
currency. Controlling for inflation seems appropriate because inflation serves
as a proxy for macroeconomic mismanagement and may thus be associated
with the prevalence and severity of banking crises (Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache 1998, 93). At the same time, inflation correlates with the
variable of interest because infation levels were generally higher in earlier
sample years, when specialized banking systems were more prevalent.  Not
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controlling for inflation could thus bias the estimate by incorrectly attribut-
ing effects of inflation to specialized banking systems.
Existing studies frequently control for countries’ economic openness. More
open and interconnected economies might be more prone to fnancial con-
tagion and might thus be more likely to experience banking crises. With-
in this study’s sample period, openness is closely linked to the emergence
and spread of neo-liberalism. This political trend emerged in Anglo-Saxon
countries and later spread to other developed economies (Konzelmann,
Fovargue-Davies and Schnyder 2012, 499–502). As established in section
2.1, Anglo-Saxon countries were historically more disposed to have special-
ized banking systems. Controlling for economic openness is thus necessary
to distinguish between the effects of (declining) specialized banking sys-
tems and more general economic liberalism. The literature applies various
approaches to measure economic openness. I include trade openness and fin-
ancial openness. Trade openness measures the sum of merchandise exports
and imports per gdp. Financial openness is constructed as the sum of total
foreign assets and total foreign liabilities divided by gdp. Both variables are
also applied in the existing literature by  Joyce (2011).
Credit measures domestic credit to the private sector as percentage of the
gdp. The variable not only serves to capture credit bubbles; in the longer
run, the variable exhibits an increasing trend and thus captures the level of
development of a fnancial sector. Svirydzenka (2016, 21) shows that credit
correlates with more sophisticated indicators for fnancial sector develop-
ment but offers longer time series. However, fnancial sector development
also coincides to some extent with a decrease in the prevalence of special-
ized banking systems. It is thus necessary to control for credit to compare
fnancial sectors that, apart from specialized banking regulation, have a sim-
ilar level of development. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 92)
and Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) fnd credit to be positively associ-
ated with the probability of banking crises.
Deposit insurance is a dummy variable indicating the availability of an
explicit deposit insurance scheme. Controlling for deposit insurance seems
prudent because its widespread introduction among sample countries falls
in the same period as the decline of specialized banking systems: In 1970
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only four sample countries had deposit insurance schemes in place while
in 2011 only one country did not have such a scheme. While explicit deposit
insurance is intended to reduce the incidence of bank runs, it may increase
moral hazard. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) fnd a positive
association of explicit deposit insurance with crisis probability and severity.
Global Financial Crisis is a dummy variable indicating the period from the
Global Financial Crisis to the end of the sample period, i.e. the years 2007 to
2011. During these years the variable is positive for every country, whether
the country is experiencing a crisis or not. The dummy serves to account for
factors that are not observed by other explanatory variables but infuence
crisis prevalence across all countries. This variable therefore serves as a sub-
stitute for year dummies that are not included in the subsequent regression
due to collinearity issues. Global Financial Crisis accounts for the – in inter-
temporal comparison – particularly pronounced contagion in the years after
2007 and should thus capture the most important time fxed effects.
Table 2.2 shows the summary statistics for each variable, table 2.3 an over-
view of the defnitions and sources.
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Table 2.2   Summary statistics
Mean Median Min. Max.
Within
std. dev.
Between
std. dev.
Overall
std. dev.
Crisis prevalence 0.143 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.347 0.071 0.350
Crisis severity 1.547 0.000 0.000 34.227  4.524 1.742 4.702
Crisis depth 0.825 0.000 0.000 18.227 2.692 1.017 2.802
Crisis duration 0.722 0.000 0.000 16.000 2.036 0.792 2.116
Specialized banking 0.188 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.296 0.260 0.391
Output gap –0.141 0.215 –33.819 24.574 6.648 0.988 6.615
Inflation 0.670 0.044 –3.917 20.440 1.554 1.439 2.134
Trade openness 13.766 0.748 0.102 286.303 12.407 35.421 38.660
Financial openness 6.259 1.617 0.179 240.749 6.597 31.165 24.550
Domestic credit 82.836 75.260 0.059 312.120 34.542 31.604 45.257
Deposit insurance 0.666 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.372 0.299 0.472
Global Financial Crisis 0.133 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.340 0.000 0.340
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Table 2.3   Definitions and sources of variables
Variable Description and sources
Dependent variables
Crisis prevalence Dummy indicating banking crisis years for each country, compiled from 
Lindgren, Garcia and Saal (1996, 21–35), Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998, 92), Bordo et al. (2001, 37–41), Glick and Hutchison 
(2001, 64–67), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Atkinson and Morelli 
(2011, 66), Valencia and Laeven (2012, 24–26), Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2014, online appendix), Jordà, Schularick and Taylor (2017, online 
appendix) and Lo Duca et al. (2017, 53–54) 
Crisis severity Index constructed as the sum of crisis depth and crisis duration
Crisis depth Maximum decrease of real gdp per capita in percent, based on Penn World 
Table (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015) 
Crisis duration Duration in years until pre-crisis level in real gdp per capita is reached, 
based on Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015); if real 
gdp per capita does not decline, duration is derived from sources on crisis 
prevalence
Variables of interest
Specialized banking Dummy indicating years in which the respective country had activity 
restrictions for banks’ securities business in place; compiled from various 
secondary sources from the economic, history and legal literature, see table
2.7 in appendix for detailed sources
Control variables
Output gap Percentage deviation of output-side real gdp from its Hodrick-Prescott 
trend, based on data from Penn World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar and 
Timmer 2015) 
Inflation Annual percentage change of price level from Penn World Table (Feenstra, 
Inklaar and Timmer 2015) 
Trade openness Sum of merchandise exports and imports divided by gdp, all from Penn 
World Table (Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer 2015) 
Financial openness Sum of total foreign assets and total foreign liabilities divided by gdp, all 
from the updated External Wealth of Nations Mark II database (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti 2007) 
Credit Domestic credit to private sector as percentage of gdp, from the World 
Bank’ World Development Indicators and, for Taiwan, Datastream
Deposit insurance Dummy indicating availability of an explicit deposit insurance scheme, 
compiled from Demirgüç-Kunt, Karacaovali and Laeven (2005, 20), 
Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane and Laeven (2014, 32) and Bank of Israel (2015)
Global Financial Crisis Dummy indicating the years 2007 to 2011
2.3 methods
I follow the approach of  Joyce (2011) by estimating the prevalence of bank-
ing crises with multivariate conditional fxed-effects logistic regression. The
inclusion of country fxed effects allows to account for time-invariant dif-
ferences among sample countries, such as cultural or lasting institutional
aspects. The F-tests on the joint signifcance of the fxed-effects dummies
indicate that a fxed-effects specifcation is preferable to pooled regression.
Thanks to a relatively long sample period and a comprehensive list of
banking crises, every sample country includes at least one crisis episode.
The inclusion of country fxed effects therefore does not lead to a loss
of observations by excluding countries without variation in the dependent
variable. Several other studies such as Demirgüç-Kunt and Detra -
giache (1998), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Beck,
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2006) resort to pooled regression for this
reason. However, these authors also acknowledge the advantages of fxed-
effects regression (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 90).
While a long and narrow panel is advantageous for the inclusion of coun-
try fxed effects, it causes collinearity issues when including time fxed ef-
fects. I thus cannot include year dummies. However, other control variables
should capture cross-sectionally similar developments over time. In addi-
tion, the dummy variable for the Global Financial Crisis constitutes a multi-
year fxed-effects variable that can be assumed to capture the most relevant
time fxed effects.
I include separate analyses where the years after the initial crisis year are
excluded for every multi-year crisis episode. This accounts for possible feed-
back effects from banking crises on included macroeconomic control vari-
ables (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998, 89;  Joyce 2011, 881).
When analysing the effects of specialized banking on crisis severity, I follow
the approach of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998, 101–103) and
limit the sample to observations during crisis episodes. In addition, I analyse
the individual additive components of the crisis severity index – crisis depth
and crisis duration – as alternative dependent variables. In contrast to the
analysis of crisis prevalence, I use pooled ordinary least square estimation
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when analysing the effects on crisis severity and its components. This is
preferable for two reasons: First, subsampling for crisis observations reduces
the available degrees of freedom necessary to include country dummies.
Second, the subsample of crisis episodes is highly imbalanced and conse-
quently barely resembles a panel. Banking crises happen at different points
in time across countries and there are long gaps of non-crisis periods
between crisis episodes. Country fxed effects would thus be of little use.
F-tests on the joint signifcance of fxed-effects dummies support the omis-
sion of country fxed effects. To account for multi-year crisis episodes, I
cluster standard errors by crisis episode. For this purpose, simultaneous
banking crises in different countries constitute separate crisis episodes.
As in the analysis of crisis prevalence, I account for possible feedback ef-
fects by analysing variants where observations after each initial crisis year
are excluded. Since clustering standard errors by crisis episode is not pos-
sible in these cases, I report heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for
these results.
2.4 results
The results of the empirical analysis indicate that specialized banking is not
associated with a decrease in the prevalence of banking crises. The analysis
even yields limited evidence for specialized banking systems being more sus-
ceptible to banking crises than universal banking systems. However, the res-
ults indicate that in the case of a banking crisis, specialized banking systems
endure less severe and less deep crises than universal banking systems.
2.4.1 Limited evidence for specialization leading to more crises
Table 2.4 reports four conditional fxed-effects logistic regressions on the de-
terminants of crisis prevalence. Model (1) is the standard model including all
available observations but excluding the dummy variable for the Global Fin-
ancial Crisis. Model (2) includes the dummy for observations after 2007 to
limit the effect of the Global Financial Crisis on the relation between special-
ized banking and crisis prevalence. The dummy accounts for the particularly
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widespread contagion during that period. Model (3) equals model (1) but,
to reduce feedback effects, excludes all crisis observation after the initial
year of each crisis episode. Model (4) combines the inclusion of the Glob-
al Financial Crisis dummy from model (2) and the reduced sample from
model (3).
Model (1) indicates a weakly signifcant positive effect of specialized bank-
ing on crisis prevalence. When including a dummy variable for the period of
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Table 2.4   Conditional fixed-efects logistic regression analysis of crisis prevalence
Crisis prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Specialized banking 0.706* 0.873** 0.676 0.776
(0.373) (0.375) (0.619) (0.611)
Output gap –0.032** –0.042*** 0.066** 0.048*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.028)
Inflation –0.006 –0.018 0.122 0.109
(0.113) (0.110) (0.149) (0.149)
Trade openness 0.025* 0.010 0.050* 0.029
(0.013) (0.012) (0.030) (0.024)
Financial openness 0.068** 0.024 0.023 –0.001
(0.028) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024)
Credit 0.015*** 0.006* 0.010** 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005)
Deposit insurance 0.423 0.319 0.355 0.207
(0.323) (0.324) (0.481) (0.495)
Global Financial Crisis 2.009*** 1.878***
(0.282) (0.437)
Observations 1121 1121 1012 1012
Chi-squared 89.347*** 142.676*** 26.412*** 45.236***
Pseudo R-squared 0.115 0.184 0.082 0.140
Results are estimated with conditional fixed-efects logistic regression. Models (2) 
and (4) include a dummy for the years 2007–2011 to account for unobserved 
common factors contributing to the Global Financial Crisis. Models (3) and (4) 
include only the initial year of each crisis to reduce potential feedback 
efects. Standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
the Global Financial Crisis in model (2), this effect becomes stronger and
more signifcant. In models (3) and (4) the relation becomes insignifcant.
However, models (3) and (4) use a reduced sample size. It is thus unclear
whether this lack of statistical robustness is caused by the reduction in ob-
servations or whether it is the result of model uncertainty (Neumayer and
Plümper 2017, 47). It is common practice in the existing literature to check
variants that exclude crisis years after the initial years of each crisis episode.
However, the historic analysis in section 2.1 indicates that the maintenance
or abolishment of specialized banking systems between 1970 and 2011 was
not endogenous to the prevalence of banking crises. It thus appears probable
that the reduced effect sizes for specialized banking in models (3) and (4)
are just the result of the reduced sample size. We should therefore not dis-
card the evidence for positive effects of specialized banking on crisis preval-
ence from models (1) and (2). Universal banking systems could accordingly
beneft from diversifcation to reduce the probability of banking crises. In
any case, the results do not support our initial hypothesis that specialized
banking reduces the prevalence of banking crises.
A closer look at effect sizes helps to assess economic signifcance. How-
ever, because logistic regression is a non-linear model, only the signs of the
estimated coefficients are directly interpretable, but not the size of the
coefficients. Odds ratios are more helpful in this regard. Table 2.5 reports the
odds ratios for the variable of interest and the related 95% confdence inter-
vals. The results suggest that the odds of specialized banking countries ex-
periencing a banking crisis are approximately twice as high as for universal
banking countries.
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Table 2.5   Odds ratios for the efect of specialized banking on crisis prevalence
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Odds ratio 2.026* 2.394** 1.967 2.174
95% confidence interval 0.976–4.206 1.148–4.993 0.585–6.618 0.656–7.199
Columns (1) to (4) show the odds ratios and the 95% confidence intervals 
for the models presented in Table 2.4. Models (3) and (4) include only
the initial year of each crisis to reduce potential feedback efects. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are 
denoted by *, ** and ***. 
To obtain more intelligible results, we can convert the odds ratio to
changes in probability. However, because the coefficients for the fxed effects
are unknown in logistic fxed-effects regressions, there is no standard ap-
proach to specify the effect size in terms of probability (Kitazawa 2012, 192;
Pforr 2013; Santos Silva and Kemp 2016, 4–13). Zhang and Yu (1998)
provide a popular approach for such a conversion. Under this approach, the
odds ratio can be converted to the risk ratio based on an assumption regard-
ing the initial probability of individuals that have not been exposed to the
treatment, so that:
(2.1)
where Pnon-exposed describes the initial crisis probability of universal banking
countries and Pexposed the crisis probability of specialized banking countries.
To obtain a meaningful initial crisis probability we can observe the preval-
ence of banking crises among universal banking countries. In our sample,
there are 137 crisis years during 910 observations of universal banking juris-
dictions. This implies a non-exposed crisis probability of 15%. Using this ref-
erence point, an odds ratio of 1.967 results in a risk ratio of 1.718. Thus
replacing all universal banking observations in the sample with specialized
banking systems would increase these countries’ crisis probability from 15%
to 26%. If, instead, we only take the year 2008 for reference, we obtain a
non-exposed probability of 63% and thus a risk ratio of 1.222. Switching all
countries to specialized banking systems would thus increase their crisis
probability in 2008 from 63% to 77%. Given these increases in probability,
we can conclude that the observed positive relation between specialized
banking and crisis prevalence is economically signifcant.
2.4.2 Less severe banking crises in specialized systems
Table 2.6 reports pooled ordinary least squares regression results for the
determinants of crisis severity and its components. The sample is reduced
to only crisis years. Models (6) and (7) report the results on crisis severity.
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Models (8) and (9) report the results on crisis depth and models (10) and
(11) report the results on crisis duration. While models (6), (8) and (10) in-
clude all crisis years, models (7), (9) and (11) exclude years after the initial
year of each crisis episode.
Model (6) indicates a signifcant negative relation between specialized
banking and crisis severity. However, the effect becomes smaller and in-
signifcant in model (7), which includes only the frst observation of each
crisis episode. The separate analysis of crisis depth and crisis duration, the
two additive components of crisis severity, clarifes this picture. No effect
is observed for specialized banking on crisis duration in models (10) and
(11). However, we observe a signifcant negative effect of specialized bank-
ing on crisis depth in models (8) and (9). Universal banking countries thus
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Table 2.6   Pooled analysis of crisis severity, depth and duration
Crisis severity Crisis depth Crisis duration
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
Specialized banking –3.699** –2.051 –3.349** –2.007* –0.351 –0.044
(1.817) (1.483) (1.396) (1.089) (0.757) (0.734)
Output gap –0.016 0.376** –0.055 0.235** 0.039 0.141**
(0.118) (0.161) (0.086) (0.114) (0.047) (0.065)
Inflation –0.902*** –0.313 –0.644** –0.285* –0.259** –0.027
(0.287) (0.225) (0.249) (0.163) (0.103) (0.109)
Trade openness –0.028** –0.010* –0.014* –0.004 –0.015*** –0.007**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Financial openness 0.009 0.034*** 0.013 0.030*** –0.005 0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
Credit 0.029 0.036* 0.016 0.020 0.013* 0.016*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.013) (0.007) (0.009)
Deposit insurance 3.564 0.848 1.990 0.240 1.574* 0.608
(2.416) (2.048) (1.888) (1.496) (0.914) (0.895)
Constant 5.628*** 3.779** 2.992* 2.101* 2.636*** 1.678*
(1.978) (1.818) (1.531) (1.205) (0.816) (0.839)
Observations 160 51 160 51 160 51
F-test 12.784*** 16.706*** 12.913*** 21.798*** 7.558*** 9.497***
Adjusted R-squared 0.175 0.263 0.156 0.224 0.167 0.182
Models (7), (9) and (11) include only the initial year of each crisis to reduce 
potential feedback efects. Results are estimated with ordinary least 
squares regression. Standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
experience on average 2 to 3.3 percentage points stronger declines in gdp
during banking crises than countries with specialized banking systems. This
effect size appears economically signifcant.
A possible explanation for deeper banking crises in universal banking
countries could be due to the higher dependence of such countries on bank
fnancing (Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine 1999). This dependence leaves
such economies with little fnancing alternatives in the case of a banking
crisis, as the capital market remains underdeveloped.4 The results are
deeper crises.
2.4.3 Discussion of control variables
This subsection discusses the results regarding control variables’ effects on
crisis probability, crisis severity and its components, as presented in tables 2.4
and 2.6.
Output gap exhibits a negative relation with crisis prevalence in models
(1) and (2), a result that contradicts our theoretical expectations. However,
when we exclude crisis observations after the initial year of each crisis epis-
ode, this result is reversed to a signifcant positive relation. A similar feed-
back effect is also observed for the relation between output gap and crisis
severity and its components. While these relations are insignifcant when
analysing the whole sample, they become signifcantly positive in models
(7), (9) and (11). The effects from output gap on all analysed dependent
variables are thus as expected when we account for feedback effects.
Inflation yields no signifcant effects on crisis prevalence. Also with re-
gard to crisis severity and its components, the observed relations are only
signifcant when we do not account for feedback effects. These results sug-
gest that infation is irrelevant as indicator for macroeconomic mismanage-
ment in high-income countries. Different fndings in the existing literature
4 I cannot efectively control for the development level of capital markets 
because data on volumes of debt securities are only available starting from
the 1990s, which would leave insuficient degrees of freedom for statistical 
inference (bis 2018).
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are most likely owed to these studies including emerging market economies
in their samples (Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache 1998;  Joyce 2011).
Trade openness and financial openness do not yield robust results on effects
on crisis prevalence. With regard to crisis severity we observe evidence of a
negative effect from trade openness. This robust negative relation is also ob-
served between trade openness and crisis duration but not between trade
openness and crisis depth. These fndings suggest that more developed inter-
national trade might help economies to recover more quickly after bank-
ing crises. Increased financial openness, however, appears to render banking
crises deeper and thus more severe.
The results for credit indicate a signifcant positive relation with crisis pre-
valence, except for model (4). The results suggest, as expected, that more
leveraged economies with more developed fnancial systems are more prone
to banking crises. In models (7), (10) and (11) we further observe some
evidence that more developed fnancial systems experience longer and more
severe banking crises.
Regarding deposit insurance we observe no signifcant effects on crisis
prevalence and crisis severity or its components, except for a weakly signifc-
ant positive effect on crisis duration in model (10). The lack of a robust sig-
nifcant effect does not correspond to the fndings of Demirgüç-Kunt and
Detragiache (2002). These authors report a positive association of de-
posit insurance and banking crises and attribute this fnding to moral haz-
ard stemming from deposit insurance. A possible explanation could be that
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) include high-income and
emerging economies in their sample. Future research would have to indi-
cate whether moral hazard from deposit insurance is stronger in emerging
economies with weaker institutions.
The dummy variable for the years of the Global Financial Crisis unsurpris-
ingly yields a signifcant positive association with crisis prevalence. This fnd-
ing refects the relevance of contagion during these crisis years and does not
qualitatively change the effect of the variable of interest.
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2.5 conclusion
In the policy discussion, after the Global Financial Crisis, reference was
made to the potentially benefcial effects the American Glass–Steagall Act
may have had on fnancial stability. This study reviews how far the Glass–
Steagall Act and other historic specialized banking systems can serve as a
model to address fnancial stability issues. To this end, I compile a compre-
hensive dataset on specialized banking systems in high-income countries
after 1929. In total, I identify ten high-income countries that at one point
had specialized banking systems in place after that year. I conduct a quali-
tative historic assessment on how regulatory restrictions on banks’ securities
business have emerged in each affected country and whether these regimes
were motivated by fnancial stability considerations. Further, I review the
actual effects these regimes had on fnancial stability. I use a panel of thirty
high-income countries between 1970 and 2011 to assess the effects of special-
ized banking systems on crisis probability and severity.
The results from the historic analysis considerably qualify the relevance
of fnancial stability consideration as a political motive for past specialized
banking systems. Out of ten high-income countries with specialized bank-
ing systems, the literature states fnancial stability considerations as polit-
ical motive for only three: the United States, Belgium and Italy. However,
for these three countries the literature presents alternative explanations that
raise questions about the sincerity of the fnancial stability motive. In the
cases of the United States and Belgium, the literature reports fnancial insti-
tutions lobbying for the separation of banking and securities business. In the
case of Italy, the literature suggests that this break-up was part of govern-
ment efforts to increase political control over the credit system.
Regarding the quantitative analysis, the results provide no support for
the popular belief that specialized banking systems are associated with de-
creased crisis probability. The analysis even yields non-robust evidence of an
opposite relation. However, regarding the severity of banking crises, the res-
ults correspond to the notion that specialized banking systems are benefcial
to fnancial stability. The results indicate that specialized banking systems
experience less deep banking crises in terms of losses in gdp per capita.
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A probable explanation for these results is that universal banks beneft
from diversifcation to some extent. These diversifcation benefts allow the
banks to better cope with minor shocks in comparison to specialized banks.
On the other side of the coin, the real economy tends to rely more on bank
fnancing in universal banking systems. In case of a banking crisis, this
leaves relatively little fnancing alternatives for the real economy, as the cap-
ital market remains underdeveloped.
Despite evidence for benefcial effects in times of banking crises, Glass–
Steagall-like regulation generally does not appear to be an effective answer
to fnancial stability concerns. Such regimes do not reduce the probability
of banking crises and there is even some evidence that specialized banking
systems increase crisis probability. To reduce the severity of banking crises
other policy measures to develop capital market fnancing should be pur-
sued.
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Table 2.7   Coding of and sources for the specialized banking variable
Country
Specialized 
banking Sources
Australia 1938–1988 Battellino and McMillan (1989, 25, 28) 
Austria Weber (1938, 12), Teichova (1994, 25), Collins (1998, 8)
Belgium 1935–1993 Weber (1938, 9), Cassiers et al. (1998, 126)
Canada <1929–1987 Thomas and Walter (1991, 110–113), Hebb and Fraser (2002, 1938)
Cyprus Pafitou (2010, 83) 
Denmark Weber (1938, 12–13), Lindblom and Andersson (1997, 181–184), 
Honkapohja (2012, 8)
Finland Lindblom and Andersson (1997, 181–184), Honkapohja (2012, 8) 
France 1941–1984 Gourio (1984), Cassis (2017, 18–19)
Germany Tilly (1994, 308), Collins (1998, 8)
Greece Barth, Nolle and Prabja (2014, 17) 
Hong Kong Jao (1974, 47, 111), Schenk (2003, 144–146), Chan (2011) 
Iceland Pálmason (1994, 533–536) 
Ireland Doherty (1994, 557)
Israel Ber, Yafeh and Yosha (1997, 1–6), Ribon and Yosha (1999)
Italy 1936–1993 Weber (1938, 14–15), Hertner (1994, 561–592), Panetta (2003, 15–16), 
De Bonis, Pozzolo and Stacchini (2012, 4)
Japan 1948–1999 Bank of Japan (1973, 48–49), Patrikis (1998, 583), (Flath 2005, 239, 
266)
Luxembourg Lehners (1994, 689, 693, 701) 
Netherlands Weber (1938, 13), Collins (1998, 8)
New Zealand 1938–1986 Grimes (1998, 294), Tanndal and Waldenström (2016, 56)
Norway Weber (1938, 13), Lindblom and Andersson (1997, 181–184), 
Honkapohja (2012, 8)
Portugal Barth, Nolle and Prabja (2014, 19) 
Singapore Lee (1990, 243, 257, 288), Giap and Kang (1999, 89–91), Brown (2006, 8)
Slovenia World Bank (2012) 
South Korea Park (1996, 249)
Spain Weber (1938, 15), Collins (1998, 8)
Sweden Weber (1938, 12–13), Lindblom and Andersson (1997, 181–184), 
Collins (1998, 8), Honkapohja (2012, 8), 
Switzerland Weber (1938, 13–14), Saunders and Walter (1994, 104–105) 
Taiwan 1968–2001 Lin (2009, 1), Huang and Lin (2011, 1111–1112) 
United 
Kingdom
<1929–1986 Hablutzel (1992, 371), Collins (1998, 20–21), Hebb and Fraser (2003,
81–82), Shabani et al. (2015, 85) 
United States 1934–1999 Kroszner and Rajan (1994, 810), Barth, Brumbaugh and Wilcox 
(2000, 191) 
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3Meta-Analysis of the Literature on 
Bank Diversifcation
After the Global Financial Crisis of 2007, the idea of limiting banks’ securi-
ties business regained popularity in many jurisdictions. Advocates for and
against such regulation claimed that the existing empirical literature on
bank income diversifcation supported their position. A closer look at the
empirical literature reveals that neither evidence for nor against benefcial
effects of bank income diversifcation clearly dominates. These heterogen-
eous results can be attributed to the wide range of methodical approaches
applied. However, the literature not only provides mixed results across dif-
ferent approaches but also presents varying results of studies with similar
approaches.
This study investigates the discord in the literature by means of meta-
regression analysis. Meta-regression analysis helps infer genuine effects and
causes for differing results of existing studies that are heterogeneous in
sample, approach and results. The technique stems from medical research
but has gained increasing popularity in economics in recent years.
Existing meta-regression analyses in economics cover a wide range of
topics. They range from employment effects of minimum wages (Card
and Krueger 1995; Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009) over aggre-
gating estimates for demand elasticities (Gallet and List 2003; Knell
and Stix 2005; Gallet 2010; Gallet and Doucouliagos 2014) to 
drivers of foreign direct investments (Feld and Heckemeyer 2011; Iamsi -
raroj and Doucouliagos 2015). To my knowledge, there are currently
only two meta-regression analyses in banking: one on frontier efficiency
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measurement (Iršová and Havranek 2010) and one on relationship lend-
ing (Kysucky and Norden 2016).
The study at hand follows the predominant approach in economic meta-
regression analysis as developed by Stanley and  Jarrell (1989), Stan -
ley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012). This study is based
on 932 regression results from thirty-four primary studies examining the ef-
fects of bank income diversifcation towards non-interest activities. The
study contributes to the literature by exploring whether, and how, bank in-
come diversifcation has a genuine effect on banks’ performances. It exploits
the limited existing research on fee and trading income to generate more
solid evidence on the effects of these types of income. Further, this study
explains the heterogeneity of the existing literature by examining the con-
ditions under which benefcial or detrimental effects are observed.
The results from this meta-regression analysis illustrate the high degree
of heterogeneity in the existing literature. Whether empirical studies fnd
positive or negative effects of diversifcation on bank performance depends
on the studies’ research design. The evidence for underlying genuine effects
observable across the body of empirical literature is mixed and for no type
of diversifcation perfectly robust. The most solid evidence observed indic-
ates that diversifcation towards trading decreases risk-adjusted proftability.
Less robust evidence suggests that diversifcation towards trading increases
both proftability and risk. There is also some evidence that diversifcation
towards fee generating activities decreases risk. However, the meta-regres-
sion analysis is inconclusive regarding the effects of increased reliance on
fee generating activities on proftability and risk-adjusted proftability.
3.1 qualitative literature review
Bank income diversifcation has been the object of economic research since
the beginning of the gradual repeal of the American Glass–Steagall Act in
the 1980s. Consequently, a large body of empirical literature investigating
the topic has developed. The following literature review illustrates the het-
erogeneity in the existing literature in terms of, both, methods and fnd-
ings. It also identifes the main strands of literature that are used for the
40 meta-analysis of the literature on bank diversification
Overview of results
Contribution to
the literature
subsequent quantitative meta-regression analysis. Like the subsequent meta-
regression analysis, this review focuses on the risk and proftability implica-
tions of bank diversifcation towards investment banking. Studies focusing
on diversifcation into non-banking industries such as insurance are thus
excluded.
3.1.1 Bank activities and related types of income
The empirical literature mostly assesses the relative importance of different
banking activities by measuring the proportion of different types of income
related to these activities. The most traditional banking activity is character-
ized by interest income. It results from the difference between the bank’s in-
terests generated from loans and mortgages and the interests paid out for
customer deposits and debt.
Interest income does not include the revenue generated from investments
in securities. The literature and data providers generally categorize such in-
come as trading income, without further distinguishing whether it derives
from proprietary trading and investing or from market making.
The other main subset of non-interest income includes fees and commis-
sions (hereinafter: fees). This type of income combines very different activi-
ties from banking segments such as retail, private, commercial or invest-
ment banking. Fee generating activities include deposit services, payment
transactions, credit cards, investment management, investment advisory,
securities underwriting, loan syndication, and merger and acquisitions ad-
visory.
Statistically exploitable information from data providers and fnancial re-
ports are generally limited to differentiating interest, fee and trading in-
come.
3.1.2 Non-interest income
Most studies measure diversifcation based on accounting fgures by distin-
guishing traditional interest income from non-interest income or measuring
assets related to such income. Since non-interest income usually makes up
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the smaller component, banks are considered more diversifed, the more
they rely on non-interest income.
Brewer (1989) fnds that a higher proportion of non-loan assets reduces
the standard deviation of daily stock market returns of American bank hold-
ing companies. Similarly, Li and Zhang (2013) and Köhler (2015) fnd for
Chinese and European banks that higher shares of non-interest income re-
duce accounting return volatilities.
In contrast, Lepetit et al. (2008) and Gambacorta and van Rixtel
(2013) fnd increased shares of non-interest income increase accounting re-
turn and risk of international banks. But these studies do not present results
on risk-adjusted proftability. For American banks, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (2010) fnd risk reducing effects only at very low levels of non-
interest income. The authors conclude that non-interest income mostly in-
creases risk without any clear benefts for proftability. For Canadian banks,
Calmès and Théoret (2012) fnd higher shares of non-interest income to
be associated with both higher risk and higher risk-adjusted proftability.
They also fnd these results when splitting non-traditional activities in vari-
ous fee-generating activities and trading. Hidayat, Kakinaka and Miya -
moto (2012) conclude that Indian banks that rely more on non-interest
income are riskier.  Ji et al. (2012) fnd increased shares in non-interest in-
come decrease risk-adjusted proftability for Taiwanese banks.
3.1.3 Specific types of non-interest income
While many studies analyse combined non-interest income, some differenti-
ate between fees and trading income. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
(2010) fnd trading to increase both risk and proftability, while fees increase
risk without associated increase of proftability. Meslier, Tacneng and
Tarazi (2014) fnd benefcial effects of increased non-interest income on
risk, proftability and risk-adjusted proftability from non-interest income,
particularly from trading.
In contrast, DeYoung and Roland (2001) fnd for an American sample
that increased fee and trading income shares increase accounting return
volatility. They also fnd that fee income increases proftability while trading
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income decreases it. Matching this result, Stiroh (2004a) fnds that in-
creased trading income reduces risk-adjusted proftability while fee income
increases risk-adjusted proftability.
Only a few studies are able to exploit more granular data that allow ana-
lysing the effects of more granular income subtypes. Kwast (1989) fnds
that trading activity as a primary dealer tends to reduce banks’ overall risk,
while engagement as a non-primary dealer increases risk. These studies are
too few and too heterogeneous to be included in detail in the subsequent
meta-regression analysis. Only their results regarding fees and trading in-
come are included. Stiroh (2004b) fnds that commercial and industrial
lending, in contrast to mortgage and consumer lending, is associated with
lower proftability and higher risk of community banks. Stiroh (2004a)
fnds that fduciary income from managing trusts is associated with higher
risk-adjusted proftability. DeYoung and Torna (2013) fnd that investment
banking and venture capital investments increase banks’ default risk while
loan servicing and securities brokerage reduce it.
Overall, the literature does not agree in regard to the effects of diversifca-
tion, neither towards non-interest income in general nor towards fee or trad-
ing income individually.
3.1.4 Constructed diversification indices
Several authors construct diversifcation variables based on a reversed Her-
fndahl concentration index. In its basic version, this diversifcation index
is:
(3.1)
where operating income is defned as the sum of interest income and non-
interest income.
Applying this or similar diversifcation measures, Stiroh (2004b) and
Stiroh and Rumble (2006) fnd that increased diversifcation reduces risk-
adjusted proftability for American banks. Altunbas, Manganelli and
Marques-Ibanez (2011) observe increased risk for more diversifed
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European and American Banks, based on occurrence of public support
during the Global Financial Crisis. Ben Gamra and Plihon (2011) fnd the
same for banks in emerging market economies, despite increased prof-
itability. Goddard, McKillop and Wilson (2008) also fnd reduced risk-
adjusted proftability for American banks in general but observe a positive
correlation for the largest banks.
In contrast, Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe (2007) fnd increased risk
but also increased risk-adjusted proftability for more diversifed banks in
the European Union. Busch and Kick (2009) fnd the same for German
banks. Brighi and Venturelli (2013) fnd benefcial effects of diversifca-
tion on both risk and risk-adjusted proftability of Italian banks. Lee, Hsieh
and Yang (2014) obtain the same results for a group of Asian countries and
Sanya and Wolfe (2011) for emerging markets.
Applying such an index allows measuring diversifcation with one single
variable. The approach also has the advantage that it models a non-linear
relation between diversifcation and risk, as expected from a portfolio theory
perspective. However, blending multiple forms of income in one index un-
necessarily reduces available information. Also, such indices imply that
equal shares from all types of income constitute the maximum level of diver-
sifcation, which is not necessarily true.
3.1.5 Qualitative industry classifications
Some studies measure diversifcation through qualitative industry classif-
cations. Geyfman (2005) fnds American banks with subsidiaries for se-
curities business from 1985 to 1999 to be less risky than other banks.
Hryckiewicz (2014) constructs her own industry classifcation from banks’
income and asset structure. She fnds universal banks to have a higher risk-
adjusted proftability than focused commercial banks or trading houses.
In contrast, Schmid and Walter (2009) identify diversifed and focused
fnancial frms based on the North American Industry Classifcation System.
They fnd that stocks of more diversifed frms are traded at a discount. In
summary, the group of studies measuring diversifcation through industry
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classifcation does not provide a uniform picture of the desirability of bank
income diversifcation.
3.1.6 Approaches not based on regression analysis
Counterfactual merger studies are a noteworthy alternative approach to re-
gression analysis. This approach is mainly observed in the early empirical
literature, when bank diversifcation was legally limited in America. Coun-
terfactual merger studies combine accounting income streams or stock re-
turns of commercial banks with securities frms or other fnancial service
providers, accounting for observed covariances. A lower income volatility
of the combined hypothetical frms compared to stand-alone banks would
prove the existence of diversifcation benefts. Such a situation occurs, for
instance, if securities business is more proftable than commercial banking
and the correlation of profts is sufficiently low.
Examples for this strand of literature include  Johnson and Meinster
(1974) and Saunders and Walter (1994) who fnd benefcial effects of se-
curities business on risk and proftability. In contrast, Boyd, Graham and
Hewitt (1993) fnd such diversifcation increases bank risk. Furthermore,
Estrella (2001) fnds these increases in risk to overcompensate for in-
creases in proftability. So, counterfactual merger studies also provide am-
biguous evidence on the desirability of bank diversifcation into securities
business.
Counterfactual merger studies have their drawbacks. This type of study
ignores benefts from economies of scope and scale. Equally, such studies
cannot account for potentially increased agency costs, conficting business
cultures and endogeneity of business strategies. Counterfactual merger
studies are not based on regression analysis and are consequently difficult
to compare with other discussed approaches. They are therefore excluded
from this meta-regression analysis.
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3.1.7 Dealing with endogeneity
It is not only diversifcation that affects bank performance. The relation is
most likely reciprocal: bank managers also consider current risk and proft-
ability levels when choosing the degree of diversifcation (Stiroh 2010,
155–156). This endogeneity may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of
the effects of diversifcation on bank performance.
Some authors apply statistical techniques to correct for endogeneity. De -
mirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) use qualitative business model cat-
egories as instrumental variable for the share of non-interest income. The
authors argue that business model categories are strictly exogenous as they
remain constant for all banks during the observation period.
Because strictly exogenous instruments are often unavailable, many re-
cent studies favour the system generalized method of moments (system
gmm) by Arellano and Bond (1991). In contrast to the traditional instru-
mental variable approach, system gmm allows using predetermined instru-
ments. Predetermined instruments are only exogenous for the respective
period, but not strictly exogenous over the whole sample period. System
gmm thus simplifes the search for instruments because variables can be in-
strumented with their own lags. The approach allows controlling for endo-
geneity under conditions where traditional instrumental variables are not
available (Greene 2012, 442). This approach is, for instance, applied by
Sanya and Wolfe (2011), Gürbüz, Yanik and Aytürk (2013), Lee, Yang
and Chang (2014), Meslier, Tacneng and Tarazi (2014) and Köhler
(2015).
3.2 data for simple and multiple meta-regression analysis
Statistically exploitable meta-data on the economic literature is not readily
available. In addition, existing studies on bank income diversifcation differ
from one another in many properties. This situation confronts meta-analysts
with a nearly continuous quality space in terms of applied approaches, ob-
served populations and obtained results. Mapping these characteristics re-
quires categorization and thus judgement. Researchers must exercise this
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judgement in a foreseeable and consistent manner to arrive at replicable
fndings. This section therefore describes how I select studies to be included
in this meta-regression analysis, explains how I construct the data set and
provides descriptive statistics.
3.2.1 Identification of relevant primary studies
The frst step in carrying out a meta-regression analysis is to create a data
set that includes all available and relevant empirical studies. To sample
these studies, I frst searched the Ideas, ScienceDirect and ssrn databases
and Google for the terms “bank income diversifcation” and “universal bank-
ing”. Second, I checked the references from the studies found in the initial
search. Here, the literature reviews by Gambacorta and van Rixtel
(2013), Stiroh (2010), Sanya (2009) and DeYoung and Roland (2001)
proved particularly helpful. Third, I used the RePEc-database to search for
studies citing hits from the frst and second rounds. In each round, I made a
preselection based on the information provided in the title and summaries.
The search ended February 2016.
The fnal data set includes published scientifc articles, books and unpub-
lished working papers that apply regression analysis to the topic of bank in-
come diversifcation. As recommended by Stanley and Doucouliagos
(2012, 35), if studies present more than one regression result, I include every
regression individually unless it does not address the research questions of
this meta-regression analysis. In consequence, I exclude observations that
focus exclusively on bank income diversifcation toward insurance activities.
Also, purely qualitative studies and merger simulations are excluded as they
cannot be aggregated with the predominant methods of meta-regression
analysis. For the same reason, some deregulation event and merger stud-
ies are excluded.5 The fnal data set consists of thirty-four studies, each
5 Despite being based on regression analysis, event studies are too diferent to 
be compared with other regression analyses. For instance, there is no non-
arbitrary way to summarize or otherwise include individual regressions for 
multiple periods after the studied event into a meta-regression analysis.
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including between one and 168 regressions. In total, the sample includes 932
observations. This chapter’s appendix, on page 85, lists the included primary
studies.
3.2.2 Subsamples for diversification and performance measures
The literature review shows that existing studies can be categorized accord-
ing to how they measure diversifcation and the kind of performance they
assess. I categorize each sampled regression based on four non-exclusive
categories of diversifcation measures: the proportion of non-interest in-
come, the proportion of fee income, the proportion of trading income and
constructed diversifcation indices. Regarding measures of bank perfor-
mance, I group each regression into three mutually exclusive categories de-
pending on whether effects on proftability, risk or risk-adjusted proftability
are analysed.
This meta-regression analysis seeks insights on how the four categories of
diversifcation measures affect the three categories of bank performance. De-
pending on what type of diversifcation is measured, we can expect to fnd
different effects on bank performance. Likewise, it is expected that risk, prof-
itability and risk-adjusted proftability are affected differently by a given
type of diversifcation measure. It is therefore inadequate to aggregate these
categories and subject them to a combined meta-regression analysis. In-
stead, I create subsamples for each pairing of the four and three categories
and analyse these twelve subsamples individually for the remainder of this
study.
Having twelve conceptually related measures of diversifcation effects on
bank performance provides opportunities for consistency checks that are un-
available to other meta-regression analyses. Such consistency checks may
compare the effects of fee and trading income to the effects of aggregated
non-interest income. Additionally, we can check whether effects on risk-
adjusted proftability are consistent with the individual effects on risk and
proftability.
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3.2.3 Construction of efect variables
Comparing the literature through meta-regression analysis requires a par-
tial and comparable measure of effect size and direction. A measure of effect
is partial if it captures the effect of one variable on another, with other
factors remaining constant. It is comparable if it uses the same unit of meas-
ure across different studies and regressions (Stanley and Doucouliagos
2012, 23). No variable that meets these conditions is directly included in the
sampled primary studies. In contrast to medical research, where many stud-
ies use the same dependent variable (e.g. mortality), dependent variables in
social sciences are more diverse. To obtain a suitable effect variable, I thus
construct the partial correlation coefficient r for each pairing of explanatory
and dependent primary study variables:
(3.2)
where t denotes the t-statistic and df the degrees of freedom of each sam-
pled regression. Where the t-statistic is not reported, I calculate it based on
available information on regression coefficients and standard errors. Where
the degrees of freedom are not reported, I calculate or estimate them based
on sample size and model specifcation. Resorting to the partial correlation
coefficient is common among economic meta-regression analyses because it
allows compiling the most comprehensive data set. This advantage counter-
acts the fact that partial correlation is not an economic measure but a statist-
ical one that cannot be used to assess economic signifcance (Stanley and
Doucouliagos 2012, 25–26).
Constructing partial correlation results in four approximately normally dis-
tributed, unitless effect variables ranging from −1 to +1. The non-interest
income effects variable summarizes the effects that primary studies fnd from
non-interest income on risk, proftability or risk-adjusted proftability of
banks. The specifc kind of effect can be isolated by subsampling for regres-
sions that focus on either risk, proftability or risk-adjusted proftability.
Likewise, the fee effects and trading effects variables summarize effects from
the shares of fees and trading income on bank performance. The index
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effects variable summarizes the effects found by primary studies using some
form of diversifcation index as an explanatory variable.
3.2.4 Moderator variable for study quality
In the context of meta-regression analysis, control variables are called mod-
erator variables. Simple meta-regression analysis only includes a single
moderator variable to capture the quality of studies and regressions in-
cluded. A variable measuring study quality can be used to account for pos-
sible publication biases, a well-known phenomenon in social sciences. In
economics, Card and Krueger (1995, 139) identify three sources of pub-
lication bias: First, reviewers may be more likely to accept papers that cor-
respond to prevalent theoretical presumptions. Second, researchers may use
the presence of expected empirical effects as a guide for further model spec-
ifcations. And third, researchers may favour model specifcations that lead
to high levels of signifcance, despite small sample sizes. Publication bias can
severely distort the results of meta-regression analysis, typically by infat-
ing the estimated effect. Identifying publication bias is thus one of the most
important contributions meta-regression analysis can make to empirical re-
search.
To identify publication bias and following Stanley (2005), I include for
each subsample the standard error of the partial correlation between diver-
sifcation and performance. The rationale is that standard errors are larger
for studies with small samples. Additionally, these studies are also more
prone to publication bias because the signifcant effects needed for success-
ful publication are harder to achieve. As a measure of study quality, stand-
ard errors have several advantages over other conceivable measures like
dummies for peer-reviewed publication or journal impact factors. Standard
errors can be calculated for all sampled studies, including unpublished ones,
and they allow individually determining the quality of each regression
within a study (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012, 34).
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3.2.5 Descriptive analysis
Table 3.1 presents an overview of defnitions of the variables included in the
subsequent simple meta-regression analysis. Table 3.2 presents the arith-
metic means of all effect and moderator variables for the overall sample and
all analysed subsamples. The table also indicates the number of papers and
regressions included in each subsample.
A preliminary analysis of the arithmetic means of the effect variables does
not provide any clarity on the effects of bank income diversifcation. Al-
though, on average, non-interest income effects and index effects decrease risk
and increase proftability, they nonetheless appear to decrease risk-adjusted
proftability. In addition, negative non-interest income effects on risk seem
implausible in comparison with positive fee effects and trading effects on risk.
After all, fees and trading income almost exclusively make up non-interest
income. So the analysis of the arithmetic means of effects provides inconsis-
tent results.
3.2.6 Visual analysis of publication bias
Figure 3.1 shows scatter plots of the effect sizes sampled from existing
empirical estimates against the precision of these estimates. Precision is
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Table 3.1   Description of variables for simple meta-regression analysis
Variable Description
Dependent efect variables
Non-interest income efects Partial correlation coeficient between primary studies’ non-interest 
income variables and bank performance
Fee efects Partial correlation coeficient between primary studies’ fee income 
variables and bank performance
Trading efects Partial correlation coeficient between primary studies’ trading 
income variables and bank performances
Index efects Partial correlation coeficient between primary studies’ diversification 
indices and bank performance
Independent moderator variable for publication bias
Standard error Standard error of the efect variable
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Figure 3.1   Funnel graphs of partial correlations and precision. The X-axes 
indicate the partial correlations of non-interest income efectss fee efectss 
trading efects and diversification efects with the bank performance in regard 
to risk, profitability and risk-adjusted profitability; the Y-axes indicate the 
precision of each regression estimate as the inverse of its standard error. The 
solid vertical lines indicate the precision-weighted average efects.
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measured by the inverse of an estimate’s standard error. These scatter plots
are called funnel graphs because, in the absence of publication bias, they
should take the shape of a reversed funnel. This shape is due to random
sampling errors, small samples, noisy data and misspecifed models that
cause estimates to disperse symmetrically around the true effect. Estimates
with higher precision cluster closely around the true effect size while less
precise estimates disperse more widely. Funnel graphs illustrate the average
and dispersion of effects. Their symmetry, or lack thereof, allows for the
visual identifcation of publication biases (Stanley and Doucouliagos
2012, 53–60).
The solid vertical lines in the funnel graphs indicate the precision-
weighted average effects for each dependent variable (Costa-Font, De -
Albuquerque and Doucouliagos 2015, 493). Since they account for
study and regression quality, weighted means are more helpful than arith-
metic means to gain an impression of the effects of income diversifcation.
The weighted means mostly show the same signs as the arithmetic means.
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Table 3.2   Summary statistics of variables for simple meta-regression analysis
Subsample
Risk Profitability Risk-adj. profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Full
Non-interest 
income efects
–0.02 0.05 –0.02
Fee efects 0.01 0.01 –0.02
Trading efects 0.01 0.11 0.05
Index efects –0.01 0.01 0.00
Standard error 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Number of papers and regressions included in subsamples
Papers 26 14 12 13 15 7 5 8 16 9 8 13 34
Regressions 309 227 218 227 109 63 57 87 150 28 24 146 932
Columns (1) to (4) refer to the subsamples for non-interest income efects, fee 
efects, trading efects and index efects. For efect variables, full sample
means are not reported because they cannot be aggregated across the sub-
samples for risk, profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. The same is
true for the standard error variable because it relates to the efect variables.
However, the signs of non-interest income effects and fee effects on risk and of
fee effects and trading effects on risk-adjusted proftability are reversed. The
comparison of precision-weighted means leads to contradicting observa-
tions: trading decreases risk and increases proftability but has negative ef-
fects on risk-adjusted proftability. The same contradicting results are found
for index effects.
A possible source for inconsistencies is publication bias. Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2012, 53–60) recommend conducting an initial visual
analysis of publication bias with the help of funnel graphs. If publication
bias is present, this results in an asymmetric funnel graph. The funnel
graphs in fgure 3.1 mostly show the expected funnel shape, except for those
with a low number of observations. The three graphs on the effects of non-
interest income may appear to bias towards the positive. Such a conclusion
seems plausible since researchers’ hypothesis would usually be that non-
interest banking business buys higher proftability with higher risks. The risk
and proftability graphs for fee effects and trading effects also depict a bias to
the positive. However, the presence of publication bias is difficult to visually
determine in graphs with a low number of observations. Section 3.6 more
formally addresses the issue of publication bias.
3.3 methods for simple meta-regression analysis
Simple meta-regression analysis allows estimating the underlying genuine
effect common to all primary studies and corrected for publication bias. To
achieve this, I follow the approach developed by Stanley and  Jarrell
(1989), Stanley (2008), and Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012).
3.3.1 Basic principle of meta-regression analysis
The most basic estimation of the genuine effects involves regressing compar-
able effect variables against a constant and an error term:
(3.3)
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where  is the i-th partial correlation reported in the j-th study and  is the
random error. This model is based on the assumption that the reported ef-
fects vary randomly around a central effect, . Hence,  is the estimate of
the genuine effect.
3.3.2 Funnel-asymmetry precision-efect test
To detect and correct publication bias, I conduct funnel-asymmetry and pre-
cision-effect tests. These tests detect publication bias as a signifcant rela-
tionship between an effect and its standard error. To conduct these tests, I
expand the basic meta-regression model from equation 3.3 to:
(3.4)
where SE denotes the standard error of the partial correlation (i.e. not the
standard error of the original regression coefficient) and  is the error term.
The funnel-asymmetry test provides an analytical version of the visual ex-
amination of a funnel graph and tests if  is signifcantly different from
zero. In this case, publication bias is present. The precision-effect test identi-
fes a genuine empirical effect corrected for publication bias by testing if 
is signifcantly different from zero.
3.3.3 Precision-efect estimate with standard error
The precision-effect test may mistakenly indicate a genuine non-zero ef-
fect in the case of excess unexplained heterogeneity in the meta-regression
model (Stanley 2008, 123). This bias can be reduced by adopting a non-
linear estimator that replaces the standard error of the partial correlation
 with its variance :
(3.5)
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, 65–67) call this procedure the preci-
sion-effect estimate with standard error. Their simulations show that this
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approach provides the best estimate of the underlying genuine effect if such
an effect is present. So if the precision-effect test yields signifcant results,
the precision-effect estimate with standard error is recommended to con-
frm the genuine effect.
3.4 additional data for multiple meta-regression analysis
In multiple meta-regression analysis, moderator variables not only measure
the quality of the primary studies included, but also the main methodical
and sampling differences. Sampling differences can occur in terms of geo-
graphy, time period or other criteria (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012,
86). Table 3.3 presents an overview of the defnitions of the additional mod-
erator variables; table 3.4 presents the arithmetic means for each analysed
subsample as summary statistics.
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Table 3.3   Description of additional variables for multiple meta-regression analysis
Variable Description
Independent moderators for sample heterogeneity
Global Financial Crisis Dummy indicating inclusion of sample years 2007, 2008 or 2009
Legal history Dummy indicating focus on countries with legal history of separating 
banking and securities business (ca, jp, ph, us)
Big banks Dummy for focus on big banks
Commercial banks Dummy for focus on commercial banks (i.e. not universal banks)
Independent moderator variables for methodical heterogeneity
Industry classifications Dummy indicating business models identification through qualitative 
industry classifications instead of accounting measures
Multiple incomes Dummy indicating distinction of more than two kinds of income
Real efects Dummy indicating usage of real efect measures like market reactions 
or default frequencies instead of accounting efects
Static risk measure Dummy indicating if a panel data analysis uses risk measure without 
risk-driven longitudinal variability
Cross-sectional Dummy for purely cross-sectional studies
Endogeneity-controlled Dummy indicating usage of instrumental variables or generalized 
method of moments to control for endogeneity
I use four moderator variables to describe the samples of primary studies.
For sample periods, I include the dummy variable Global Financial Crisis,
which is positive if the sample period includes years 2007, 2008 or 2009. For
sample regions, I add a dummy identifying studies that focus on countries
with a legal history of separating banking and securities businesses. Coun-
tries that have such a legal history and are a focus area of sampled stud-
ies are Canada,  Japan, the Philippines and the United States. To describe
whether primary studies or individual regressions focus on specifc groups of
banks, I include dummy variables for big banks and commercial banks. Many
studies report separate regressions for half the banks above and below the
median size of the respective overall sample. The big banks variable refects
this subsampling and is thus not based on an objective threshold such as
total assets. This variable also indicates studies focusing on the largest banks
in a given geographic area. The commercial banks variable applies if primary
samples exclude universal and pure investment banks or concentrate on co-
operatives or credit unions.
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Table 3.4   Summary statistics of additional variables for multiple meta-regression analysis
Subsample
Risk Profitability Risk-adj. profitability
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) Full
Global Financial 
Crisis
0.41 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.56 0.76 0.84 0.54 0.37 0.32 0.38 0.24 0.50
Legal history 0.33 0.20 0.18 0.34 0.46 0.14 0.19 0.44 0.53 0.50 0.67 0.60 0.35
Big banks 0.44 0.19 0.18 0.25 0.38 0.13 0.11 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.08 0.20 0.29
Commercial banks 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.13
Industry 
classifications
0.03 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.30 0.07
Multiple incomes 0.04 0.97 1.00 0.69 0.03 0.87 0.96 0.54 0.10 0.79 1.00 0.10 0.34
Real efects 0.40 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.21 0.16 0.27
Static risk measure 0.60 0.33 0.30 0.41 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.46
Cross-sectional 0.25 0.17 0.18 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.14 0.15
Endogeneity-
controlled
0.18 0.63 0.66 0.67 0.42 0.76 0.86 0.60 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.35
Columns (1) to (4) refer to the subsamples for non-interest income efects, fee 
efects, trading efects and index efects.
Another group of moderator variables describes the methodical approach-
es of primary studies. The frst two variables of this group specify more
closely how diversifcation is measured. I include a moderator variable to
distinguish studies based on industry classifications from those based on ac-
counting measures of diversifcation. The dummy variable multiple incomes
indicates studies that distinguish more than two types of income, which are
most often traditional interest income and non-interest income.
Two dummy variables describe how effects are measured. The real effects
variable distinguishes studies using price reactions, bail-outs and defaults
from studies measuring accounting effects. The dummy variable static risk
measure indicates studies that include the Z-score or similar measures as
dependent variable. The Z-score is an indicator for default risk and is fre-
quently included in panel data studies on bank diversifcation (e.g. Stiroh
2004b; Sanya and Wolfe 2011). The indicator measures the number of
standard deviations that net income must fall to wipe out equity:
(3.6)
Despite its popularity, the Z-score can be criticized (Lepetit and Strobel
2013). Almost all authors applying this measure calculate the standard devi-
ation of net income over the entire sampling period. This causes the longi-
tudinal variability of the Z-score to solely depend on leverage and it could
thus impede the identifcation of risk effects from income diversifcation.
To account for this possible problem, the static risk measure variable is in-
cluded.
Further methodical study characteristics are captured by a dummy vari-
able indicating purely cross-sectional studies and the dummy variable endo-
geneity-controlled. The latter identifes studies that apply modern techniques
to account for endogeneity, such as instrumental variables or system gmm.
I exclude several other available moderator variables because they yield
insignifcant results in general-to-specifc model selection (Stanley and
Doucouliagos 2012, 91). These excluded variables are dummy variables
for geographic focus on North America, Europe, the Asia-Pacifc region and
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emerging market economies. Also excluded are dummies for authors con-
tributing to multiple studies because no author fxed effects are observed.
3.4.1 Data dependence
Estimating the discussed meta-regression analysis models with ordinary
least squares requires the reported estimates r to be statistically indepen-
dent. Such an approach would be based on the assumption that the
error terms are independently and identically distributed. This assumption
might be too strong when sampling several regressions per study because
using similar data and methods can shrink standard errors. I thus account
for within study data dependency by applying cluster-robust precision-
weighted least squares and clustering regressions from the same study
(Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos 2015).
3.5 methods for multiple meta-regression analysis
The expected value of a reported estimate often depends on many charac-
teristics of the analysed primary studies. Leaving this heterogeneity unac-
counted may lead to omitted variable bias. The variance of effects can then
dominate the average effect so that simple meta-regression analysis yields
no signifcant results, even if a genuine effect is present. Multiple meta-
regression analysis is the tool to account for such heterogeneity. As for sim-
ple meta-regression analysis, I follow the approach developed by Stanley
and  Jarrell (1989), Stanley (2008) and Stanley and Doucouliagos
(2012, 91). Bel and Fageda (2009), Costa-Font, De-Albuquerque and
Doucouliagos (2015), and Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos (2015) pro-
vide illustrative applications.
3.5.1 Multiple meta-regression model
Multiple meta-regression analysis can be used to account for heterogeneity
by explicitly modelling any research characteristics with a potential effect
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on observed results. Doing so not only reduces the danger of omitted vari-
able bias, but it also provides additional insight on the aspects of research
design driving the observed results. I thus expand equation 3.4 to:
(3.7)
where Z is a vector of moderator variables that describe sample character-
istics and methodical differences. This equation represents the main model
used for subsequent multiple meta-regression analysis.
3.5.2 General-to-specific model selection
To determine which moderator variables to include in Z, Stanley and
Doucouliagos (2012, 91) recommend the general-to-specifc approach of
model selection. They recommend coding a broad range of moderator vari-
ables that could infuence the effect measure or that are commonly included
in meta-regression analyses. Starting by including all available moderators,
the variable with the lowest p-value is dropped in each regression run until
only statistically signifcant variables remain. In this study I adapt this ap-
proach because the different measures of diversifcation and performance
are conceptionally closely related. For instance, a variable that is insignif-
cant regarding risk-adjusted proftability should not be dropped if it signif-
icantly contributes to the effects on risk or proftability. I thus separately
follow the general-to-specifc approach for all twelve combinations of diver-
sifcation and performance measures. The variables that are signifcant in at
least one model are then applied to all models.
3.5.3 Robustness checks
As an alternative to cluster-robust precision-weighted least squares and fol-
lowing Stanley (2008) and Iamsiraroj and Doucouliagos (2015), I use
degrees of freedoms as weights. As a second robustness test, I use a multi-
level mixed effects model with restricted maximum likelihood estimation
(Doucouliagos and Stanley 2009; Costa-Font, De-Albuquerque
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and Doucouliagos 2015). This approach is an alternative to correct for
within study dependencies. To do so, I interpret the data set as an unbal-
anced panel: individual studies make up the cross-sectional dimension and
their regressions the longitudinal.
For each of these three variants I include sub-variants with squared stand-
ard errors, instead of standard errors, as moderator for study quality. The
inclusion of squared standard errors provides an analogy to the precision-
effect estimate with standard errors from simple meta-regression analysis.
In total, this set-up results in six different model specifcations for the mul-
tiple meta-regression analysis.
3.6 results
The following section presents and discusses the results from applying the
discussed methods to the presented data. The main question is if there are
underlying genuine effects of diversifcation on bank performance present in
the empirical literature. If such effects are present, the two simple and six
multiple meta-regression model specifcations should all yield concurrent
signifcant results. However, excess heterogeneity in the literature may in-
hibit simple meta-regression analysis. Multiple meta-regression analysis can
account for such heterogeneity. Thus, simple meta-regression analysis yield-
ing no clear results does not necessarily preclude the existence of genuine
effects if multiple meta-regression analysis indicates otherwise.
I interpret results as evidence for genuine effects, if both simple meta-
regression models yield concurrent signifcant results that are not contra-
dicted by any of the six extended models. If the results from simple meta-
regression analysis are unclear, I still accept them as evidence for genuine
effects if at least fve of the six extended models yield concurrent signifcant
results without any contradicting results. If evidence for two performance
measures fulfl these criteria, I accept matching but weaker evidence for the
third.
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3.6.1 Genuine efects and publication bias in the simple model
Table 3.5 provides the formal equivalent to the visual funnel graph analysis
presented in fgure 3.1. For each of the four effect variables, the table
presents three models: The weighted average columns display the results
for the precision-weighted intercept-only regression model as previously de-
scribed in equation 3.3. This naive form of meta-regression analysis is only
included as a reference to illustrate the infuence of publication bias. The
fat-pet columns display the results for the funnel-asymmetry precision-
effect test of equation 3.4. The standard error coefficient of this model
provides the funnel-asymmetry test and the intercept provides the precision-
effect test. The peese columns show the results for the precision-effect es-
timate with standard errors as described by equation 3.5. Its intercept is less
likely to overstate the absolute value of the genuine effect than the preci-
sion-effect test.
The results indicate a signifcant positive precision-effect estimate with
standard errors for non-interest income effects on proftability. However, the
purpose of this test is to provide a confrmation for a signifcant precision-
effect test, which we cannot observe in this case. Evidence of genuine posit-
ive non-interest income effects on proftability is therefore weak and non-
robust. In addition, non-zero non-interest income effects on proftability
would be inconsistent with the lack of evidence against zero effects on risk
and risk-adjusted proftability. As for publication bias, there is no evidence
for such bias for non-interest income effects on risk, proftability or on risk-
adjusted proftability.
For fee effects, the naive aggregation of the intercept-only precision-
weighted least squares model yields a signifcantly positive effect on proft-
ability. The funnel-asymmetry test indicates the presence of a negative
publication bias. Corrected for this publication bias, the observed genuine
effect, as provided by the precision-effect test, is even more signifcant and
positive. The precision-effect estimate with standard errors confrms this
positive genuine effect. Nonetheless, this per se solid evidence is not com-
plemented with consistent results for fee effects on risk or risk-adjusted proft-
ability. In both cases, the results indicate no evidence of non-zero genuine
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effects. For fee effects on risk and risk-adjusted proftability, there is also no
evidence of publication bias.
For trading effects, the results of the precision estimate test indicate a sig-
nifcant genuine negative effect on risk-adjusted proftability. The precision-
effect estimate with standard errors confrms this fnding. The funnel-asym-
metry test indicates a signifcant positive publication bias. This observation
means that, on average, publication bias causes the existing empirical liter-
ature to falsely report less negative trading effects on risk-adjusted proftabil-
ity. Consistent with this fnding, there is evidence of positive trading effects
on risk: the precision-effect estimate with standard errors is signifcantly
positive. However, because the precision estimate test is insignifcant, this
evidence is weak. With regard to trading effects on proftability, evidence
suggests that the mostly positive effects reported in the literature can be en-
tirely attributed to publication bias. If controlled for publication bias, the
results show no genuine non-zero trading effect on proftability. So, in sum-
mary, trading increases risk and decreases risk-adjusted proftability without
having an observable effect on proftability. Therefore, if bank managers de-
cide to diversify towards trading activities, this might be because of miss-
aligned incentives with disproportionate upside potential for managers, as
suggested by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010, 637).
For index effects, there is neither evidence for non-zero genuine effects on
risk, proftability and risk-adjusted proftability nor for the presence of pub-
lication bias.
In summary, simple meta-regression analysis yields evidence that fee in-
come increases proftability if corrected for publication bias. Also, trading
income increases risk and decreases risk-adjusted proftability. The results
also exhibit some inconsistencies. Namely, the observed evidence for posit-
ive fee effects on proftability lacks matching evidence for effects on risk or
risk-adjusted proftability. A possible explanation for such inconsistencies
could lie in differing subsamples of the primary studies included in the
twelve individual meta-regression analyses. Table 3.2 shows that the sub-
samples resulting from observing different effect variables and bank per-
formance measures differ considerably. And in table 3.5, the low adjusted
R-squared measures indicate that the simple meta-regression analysis leaves
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Table 3.5   Simple meta-regression analysis
Non-interest income efects on risk Non-interest income
Weighted average fat-pet peese Weighted average
Constant –0.034 (0.050) –0.054 (0.071) –0.039 (0.053) 0.031* (0.016)
Standard error 0.783 (0.834)
Squared standard error 3.898 (2.629)
Adjusted R-squared 0.004 0.013
Observations 309 309 309 109
Fee efects on risk Fee efects on
Weighted average fat-pet peese Weighted average
Constant 0.005 (0.006) –0.007 (0.011) 0.002 (0.007) 0.031* (0.015)
Standard error 0.381 (0.347)
Squared standard error 0.002 (1.117)
Adjusted R-squared 0.013 0.012
Observations 227 227 227 63
Trading efects on risk Trading efects on
Weighted average fat-pet peese Weighted average
Constant 0.006 (0.005) 0.002 (0.015) 0.008* (0.004) 0.064** (0.022)
Standard error 0.110 (0.552)
Squared standard error –1.369 (3.618)
Adjusted R-squared –0.004 –0.003
Observations 218 218 218 57
Index efects on risk Index efects on
Weighted average fat-pet peese Weighted average
Constant –0.007 (0.021) 0.013 (0.025) –0.005 (0.022) 0.016 (0.033)
Standard error –0.692 (0.492)
Squared standard error –2.223 (2.569)
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.002
Observations 227 227 227 87
Estimates are precision-weighted least squares. Weighted averages illustrate 
naive efects if publication bias is ignored. Significant standard errors in funnel-
asymmetry tests (fat) indicate publication bias. Significant constants in 
precision estimate tests (pet) and precision-efect estimate with standard 
errors (peese) indicate genuine efects. Cluster-robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Levels of significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** 
and ***.
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efects on profitability Non-interest income efects on risk-adjusted profitability
fat-pet peese Weighted average fat-pet peese
0.012 (0.016) 0.031* (0.016) –0.008 (0.021) 0.006 (0.031) –0.006 (0.022)
0.833 (0.595) –0.629 (1.132)
0.620 (3.431) –1.668 83.370)
0.025 –0.009 0.007 –0.003
109 109 150 150 150
profitability Fee efects on risk-adjusted profitability
fat-pet peese Weighted average fat-pet peese
0.060** (0.018) 0.035* (0.015) –0.006 (0.021) 0.007 (0.027) –0.004 (0.022)
–1.185** (0.384) –0.719 (0.541)
–5.047*** (0.846) –2.597*** (0.334)
0.097 0.094 0.019 0.038
63 63 28 28 28
profitability Trading efects on risk-adjusted profitability
fat-pet peese Weighted average fat-pet peese
–0.073 (0.042) 0.017 (0.016) –0.008 (0.022) –0.112* (0.050) –0.055*** (0.013)
5.014* (1.878) 4.819* (2.458)  
46.719* (20.828) 63.546*** (7.034)
0.421 0.376 0.449 0.754
57 57 24 24 24
profitability Index efects on risk-adjusted profitability
fat-pet peese Weighted average fat-pet peese
0.036 (0.040) 0.022 (0.035) –0.003 (0.013) –0.001 (0.020) –0.002 (0.015)
–0.726 (0.513) –0.121 (0.694)
–5.427 (3.193) –1.690 (8.098)
0.005 0.002 –0.006 –0.006
87 87 146 146 146
much of the heterogeneity among primary studies unexplained. Adding
more moderator variables to account for this heterogeneity therefore seems
necessary (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012, 81).
3.6.2 Combined efects predicted by the extended model
In multiple meta-regression analysis, unlike simple meta-regression ana-
lysis, the genuine effect observed over all primary studies cannot be directly
read from the intercept. Instead, we must calculate a combined effect based
on assumed moderator variable values.
Stanley and Doucouliagos (2012, 98) argue that in order to calculate
a combined effect, the assumed moderator values should represent best
practice research design. If it is unclear which research design represents
best practice, these authors recommend the use of sample means as moder-
ator values. Accordingly, when calculating the combined effects I generally
assume the full sample’s arithmetic means, as reported in table 3.2, as mod-
erator values. As exceptions to this rule, best practice seems to be a clear
choice for the moderator variables Global Financial Crisis and endogeneity-
controlled. For these variables I assume the value one. Including the years
2007 to 2009 in the sample period seems appropriate because the effects on
bank performance under such adverse conditions are most relevant for
policy implications. Also, setting the Global Financial Crisis variable to one
gives a higher weight to newer studies that are, in general, methodically
more advanced. For the same reason, it is also appropriate to assume a pos-
itive value for the endogeneity-controlled variable. To flter out potential ef-
fects from publication bias, I set the variables standard error and squared
standard error to zero. Following common practice in forecasting, I calcu-
late the 95% prediction interval for each point estimate.
Table 3.6 summarizes the predicted combined effects for this best prac-
tice research design and the multiple meta-regression model described by
equation 3.7. For comparison, the table also summarizes the results from
the simple meta-regression analysis. To illustrate the robustness of the
estimated prediction intervals, the two columns for positive and negative
genuine effects state the proportion of the six model specifcations that yield
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Table 3.6   Overview of empirical evidence for genuine efects
Extended model
Simple model
Best practice 
design
Good practice 
designs
All potential 
designs
+ – + – + – + –
Non-interest income efects on
Risk 0% 0% 0% 100% 5% 60% 12% 51%
Profitability 50% 0% 66.00% 0% 39% 4% 22% 28%
Risk-adjusted profitability 0% 0% 0% 0% 21% 49% 27% 35%
Fee efects on
Risk 0% 0% 0% 17% 0% 18% 7% 24%
Profitability 100% 0% 17% 33% 13% 25% 20% 28%
Risk-adjusted profitability 0% 0% 50% 0% 38% 0% 45% 4%
Trading efects on
Risk 50% 0% 33% 0% 23% 2% 16% 15%
Profitability 0% 0% 100% 0% 66% 6% 40% 38%
Risk-adjusted profitability 0% 100% 0% 83% 0% 88% 0% 66%
Index efects on
Risk 0% 0% 0% 100% 1% 75% 38% 31%
Profitability 0% 0% 0% 50% 40% 16% 46% 11%
Risk-adjusted profitability 0% 0% 0% 33% 2% 58% 20% 37%
The columns for the simple model summarize the results from simple meta-
regression analysis. The percentages describe the proportion of the two model 
specifications (precision estimate test and precision-efect estimate with standard 
errors) that yield positive or negative results significant at the 10% level. The 
columns for the extended model summarize the results from multiple meta-
regression analysis. The best practice design assumes that publication bias is 
absent, the Global Financial Crisis is included in the sample period, endogeneity is 
controlled and all other moderator variables are equal to their arithmetic mean in 
the full sample. The percentages for best practice design describe the proportion 
of six model specifications that yield positive or negative prediction intervals at 
the 95% level of confidence. Under good practice designs, all moderator variables 
previously set to sample means are allowed to take any binary value. All potential 
research designs include the combinations of all binary values of all moderator 
dummy variables. Publication bias is always assumed to be absent. For good prac-
tice designs and all potential designs, the percentages describe the proportion of 
research designs with positive or negative prediction intervals for at least four of 
six regression models at the 95% level of confidence.
signifcant positive or negative predictions. The individual point estimates
and prediction intervals are reported in tables 3.7 to 3.10 in section 3.6.6,
where I also discuss the infuence of individual moderator variables.
The best practice combined non-interest income effects on risk are signifc-
antly negative over all six models. Overall, the existing empirical literature
thus fnds diversifcation towards more non-interest income helps banks to
reduce their risks. There is also some evidence for signifcant positive com-
bined non-interest income effects on proftability. However, this evidence is
not robust as only two of six models yield signifcant results. The evidence
for positive effects on proftability is further limited by the lack of evidence
for positive non-interest income effects on risk-adjusted proftability. All res-
ults for positive non-interest income effects on risk-adjusted proftability are
insignifcant.
The best practice combined fee effects on risk-adjusted proftability are
positive for three of the six models. One of the six models indicates that this
relation is driven by negative effects on risk. While simple meta-regression
analysis suggests positive fee effects on proftability, multiple meta-regression
cannot confrm this relation. Two of the six models indicate signifcant neg-
ative fee effects on proftability and one indicates positive effects. The results
are thus inconsistent.
Five of the six models indicate signifcant negative combined trading ef-
fects on risk-adjusted proftability. This fnding is consistent with the results
from the simple meta-regression analysis. The relation appears to be driven
by a positive effect on risk, albeit evidence for this is only robust over two of
the six models. Nonetheless, this evidence for positive effects on risk gains
additional credibility from signifcant positive trading effects on proftability
observed over all six models. Also, positive trading effects on risk are consist-
ent with the non-robust evidence from the simple meta-regression analysis.
Consistent with the results for non-interest income effects, the results indic-
ate signifcant negative combined index effects on risk over all six models.
This result also supports the evidence for negative fee effects on risk. Since
trading positively affects risk, yet index effects and non-interest income ef-
fects on risk are negative, negative fee effects on risk overcompensate positive
trading effects.
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3.6.3 Sensitivity analysis of predicted combined efects
The existing empirical literature on the effects of bank income diversifca-
tion uses a wide range of research designs. What constitutes best practice
for each moderator variable is, therefore, unclear. For this reason, this sec-
tion analyses how sensitive predicted combined effects react to changes in
research design, that is, to changes in assumptions regarding moderator
parameter values.
For a frst sensitivity analysis I defne standard error and squared standard
error as zero while Global Financial Crisis and endogeneity-controlled are set
to one. These assumptions are identical to those made for the best practice
research design. In contrast to the best practice assumptions, I allow all
other dummy variables to take any binary value. This specifcation results in
 possible good practice research designs. I then calculate the point
estimates and 95% prediction intervals for all 256 combinations times the six
multiple meta-regression models. I count combinations as evidence for pos-
itive or negative effects if at least four of the six models consistently yield
signifcantly positive or negative predictions without signifcant results of
the opposite sign. In a second sensitivity analysis I relax the restriction of
Global Financial Crisis and endogeneity-controlled to one. This new specifca-
tion expands the analysis to 210 = 1024 possible research designs.
The columns for “good practice designs” and “all potential designs” in
table 3.6 report the results of the two sensitivity analyses. The results show
that all combined effect predictions are, to some extent, sensitive to as-
sumed parameter values. Given the discord in the relevant empirical literat-
ure, this observation is no surprise. Robust predicted combined effects over
all possible research designs could only be reasonably expected if the empir-
ical literature was mostly in consensus. However, in such a situation, meta-
regression analysis adds no value. I thus accept results if there is a gap of at
least ffty percentage points between positive and negative good practice
research designs.
Generally, the clearer the results from best practice predictions, the less
sensitive these predictions are to assumed parameter values. The good prac-
tice sensitivity analysis shows fairly clear support for negative trading effects
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Table 3.7   Multiple meta-regression analysis for non-interest income efects
Efects on risk Efects on profitability
Precision wls df wls Mixed-efects Precision wls
Standard error 2.222 –0.161 1.039 –0.011
(1.391) (0.652) (0.540) (0.403)
Squared standard error 7.718 2.145 0.957 1.549
(4.307) (3.270) (2.932) (2.780)
Global Financial Crisis –0.145** –0.130 –0.064 –0.067 –0.048 –0.037 –0.057*** –0.054**
(0.066) (0.065) (0.037) (0.036) (0.056) (0.055) (0.017) (0.018)
Legal history 0.081 0.098 0.042 0.042 0.106 0.117** –0.074*** –0.076***
(0.047) (0.048) (0.025) (0.026) (0.057) (0.056) (0.014) (0.017)
Big banks –0.003 0.006 0.024 0.023 0.016 0.021 0.029 0.031
(0.027) (0.026) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028) (0.028) (0.020) (0.019)
Commercial banks –0.034** –0.036 –0.022** –0.022** –0.035 –0.033 0.009** 0.010**
(0.016) (0.018) (0.009) (0.009) (0.041) (0.041) (0.004) (0.004)
Industry classifications 0.179** 0.206** 0.096*** 0.093** 0.152 0.206 –0.016 –0.015
(0.076) (0.093) (0.033) (0.034) (0.126) (0.128) (0.022) (0.024)
Multiple incomes –0.150*** –0.171*** –0.095*** –0.094*** –0.127 –0.136 –0.005 –0.004
(0.038) (0.040) (0.024) (0.025) (0.070) (0.071) (0.011) (0.011)
Real efects –0.127** –0.123** –0.038 –0.041 –0.137*** –0.140*** 0.034** 0.031**
(0.050) (0.048) (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.012) (0.011)
Static risk measure –0.001 0.008 –0.021 –0.022 –0.048 –0.044 –0.046 –0.050
(0.062) (0.054) (0.043) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.028) (0.029)
Cross-sectional –0.263*** –0.241** –0.088** –0.094** –0.169*** –0.197*** –0.001 –0.002
(0.087) (0.089) (0.039) (0.036) (0.064) (0.062) (0.031) (0.031)
Endogeneity-controlled 0.039 0.043 0.004 0.005 –0.071 –0.073 –0.100** –0.111**
(0.056) (0.051) (0.022) (0.023) (0.049) (0.049) (0.036) (0.039)
Constant 0.024 0.046 0.050 0.049 0.045 0.064 0.120*** 0.124***
(0.069) (0.063) (0.043) (0.045) (0.072) (0.070) (0.027) (0.032)
Observations 309 309 309 309 309 309 227 227
Adjusted R-squared 0.422 0.389 0.181 0.182 0.424 0.426
Combined efect –0.170** –0.118** –0.050** –0.055** –0.154** –0.122** 0.051** 0.091**
95% prediction interval ±0.067 ±0.040 ±0.031 ±0.023 ±0.059 ±0.055 ±0.076 ±0.070
Standard errors are in parentheses (cluster-robust for wls). Levels of 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
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Efects on risk-adjusted profitability
df wls Mixed-efects Weighted average df wls Mixed-efects
–0.293 –0.140 0.113 –1.200 –1.589**
(0.362) (0.494) (1.058) (0.941) (0.788)
–0.777 3.683 0.565 –1.81 –5.965
(3.069) (3.362) (4.027) (7.173) (4.174)
–0.057*** –0.056*** –0.036 –0.038 –0.115** –0.114 –0.113*** –0.136*** –0.072 –0.075
(0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.036) (0.048) (0.057) (0.037) (0.045) (0.078) (0.080)
–0.074*** –0.072*** –0.097*** –0.093*** –0.069 –0.069 –0.094*** –0.100*** 0.098 0.100
(0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.008) (0.009) (0.137) (0.128)
0.016 0.018 0.054** 0.050** 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.009 0.009 0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.013) (0.008) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021)
0.008** 0.008** 0.01 0.011 –0.008 –0.008 –0.021*** –0.021*** –0.009 –0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.029) (0.029)
–0.01 –0.011 –0.017 –0.019 –0.184*** –0.181*** –0.191*** –0.224*** –0.067 –0.072
(0.018) (0.018) (0.043) (0.042) (0.030) (0.040) (0.029) (0.015) (0.349) (0.321)
–0.007 –0.006 0.026 0.028 –0.025 –0.025 0.003 0.008 –0.028 –0.025
(0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.041) (0.042) (0.018) (0.017) (0.031) (0.032)
0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033 0.028 0.016 0.016 0.035*** 0.030** 0.052 0.045
(0.007) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.028) (0.027) (0.010) (0.010) (0.054) (0.055)
–0.033 –0.034 –0.076*** –0.074*** –0.202*** –0.202*** –0.229*** –0.237*** 0.004 0.007
(0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026) (0.061) (0.066) (0.043) (0.050) (0.262) (0.244)
–0.015 –0.015 0.03 0.025 0.038 0.038 0.059*** 0.055*** –0.103 –0.099
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.009) (0.009) (0.249) (0.229)
–0.090*** –0.094*** –0.158*** –0.154*** 0.000 0.000 –0.029 –0.028 0.010 0.009
(0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.031)
0.121*** 0.116*** 0.141*** 0.135*** 0.240** 0.241*** 0.298*** 0.295*** 0.043 0.007
(0.028) (0.027) (0.048) (0.047) (0.082) (0.077) (0.048) (0.051) (0.293) (0.274)
227 227 227 227 150 150 150 150 150 150
0.486 0.484 0.283 0.283 0.596 0.579
–0.013 0.040 0.249** 0.229** –0.003 –0.0002 0.024 –0.010 0.004 –0.036
±0.081 ±0.071 ±0.086 ±0.080 ±0.039 ±0.033 ±0.029 ±0.026 ±0.142 ±0.129
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Table 3.8   Multiple meta-regression analysis for fee efects
Efects on risk Efects on profitability
Precision wls df wls Mixed-efects Precision wls
Standard error 0.617** 0.460 1.126*** –1.491**
(0.248) (0.559) (0.388) (0.408)
Squared standard error 2.054 3.085 –11.748*** –4.628***
(1.027) (2.096) (3.846) (0.627)
Global Financial Crisis 0.031 0.023 0.038 0.034 –0.004 –0.006 –0.064 –0.041
(0.055) (0.057) (0.023) (0.021) (0.065) (0.059) (0.036) (0.037)
Legal history –0.06 –0.072 –0.044 –0.050 0.001 0.067 –0.079** –0.094
(0.048) (0.048) (0.052) (0.046) (0.068) (0.061) (0.029) (0.039)
Big banks 0.038 0.038 0.037 0.037 –0.001 –0.019 0.095** 0.072
(0.035) (0.035) (0.019) (0.019) (0.026) (0.028) (0.034) (0.035)
Commercial banks 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.005 –0.002 0.000 0.009 0.012
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008)
Industry classifications
Multiple incomes 0.007 0.010 0.008 0.009 –0.057 –0.029 0.02 0.019
(0.051) (0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.105) (0.096) (0.033) (0.036)
Real efects 0.007 0.013 0.004 0.006 –0.041 –0.001
(0.022) (0.026) (0.017) (0.016) (0.038) (0.041)
Static risk measure –0.033 –0.031 –0.004 –0.004 –0.129*** –0.124*** –0.154 –0.171
(0.038) (0.039) (0.004) (0.004) (0.028) (0.027) (0.081) (0.097)
Cross-sectional –0.085 –0.079 –0.063 –0.059 –0.001 –0.032
(0.060) (0.062) (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.052)
Endogeneity-controlled –0.091*** –0.082*** –0.061 –0.056 –0.102** –0.083** 0.076 0.032
(0.026) (0.027) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.042) (0.076) (0.071)
Constant 0.039 0.055 0.005 0.014*** 0.134 0.046 0.049*** 0.034***
(0.041) (0.042) (0.014) (0.004) (0.087) (0.076) (0.004) (0.005)
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 63 63
Adjusted R-squared 0.122 0.107 0.101 0.099 0.493 0.449
Combined efect –0.054 –0.038 –0.030 –0.020 –0.062 –0.097** –0.002 –0.058
95% prediction interval ±0.067 ±0.068 ±0.054 ±0.055 ±0.086 ±0.079 ±0.069 ±0.063
Standard errors are in parentheses (cluster-robust for wls). Levels of 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***. Some variables 
are dropped because of collinearity issues.
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Efects on risk-adjusted profitability
df wls Mixed-efects Weighted average df wls Mixed-efects
–1.746** –0.624 –1.422** –2.998** –2.288
(0.667) (1.526) (0.468) (0.943) (1.551)
–9.685 –0.862 –2.637*** –4.824 –3.420
(5.001) (6.395) (0.607) (2.974) (6.982)
–0.090 –0.074 –0.049 –0.056 –0.046 –0.056 –0.026 –0.038 –0.061 –0.076
(0.041) (0.040) (0.271) (0.283) (0.078) (0.086) (0.057) (0.069) (0.103) (0.129)
–0.055** –0.056** –0.128 –0.138 –0.125*** –0.092*** –0.161*** –0.089*** –0.146 –0.089
(0.018) (0.022) (0.287) (0.300) (0.016) (0.012) (0.025) (0.010) (0.090) (0.101)
0.099 0.075 0.121** 0.112** 0.040*** 0.036** 0.039*** 0.034*** 0.043* 0.039*
(0.042) (0.039) (0.049) (0.044) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006) (0.010) (0.023) (0.023)
0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.014) (0.014)
0.006 0.006 –0.001 –0.001 0.031** –0.001 0.071** –0.002 0.057 –0.010
(0.015) (0.017) (0.041) (0.041) (0.012) (0.002) (0.025) (0.004) (0.094) (0.102)
0.125* 0.078 0.138 0.102
(0.062) (0.069) (0.127) (0.156)
–0.103** –0.109** –0.089** –0.089** –0.117 –0.101
(0.029) (0.035) (0.041) (0.041) (0.076) (0.086)
0.124 0.086 –0.194*** –0.194*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.031 0.029
(0.063) (0.060) (0.035) (0.035) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.029) (0.029)
0.050*** 0.035*** 0.04 0.034 0.173* 0.140 0.074*** 0.044*** 0.064** 0.051*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.230) (0.240) (0.075) (0.086) (0.010) (0.001) (0.027) (0.027)
63 63 63 63 28 28 28 28 28 28
0.528 0.491 0.589 0.506 0.819 0.715
0.048** 0.002 –0.253** –0.272** 0.081** 0.043** 0.093** 0.033 0.052 0.008
±0.045 ±0.038 ±0.176 ±0.178 ±0.041 ±0.040 ±0.042 ±0.049 ±0.089 ±0.101
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Table 3.9   Multiple meta-regression analysis for trading efects
Efect on risk Efects on profitability
Precision wls df wls Mixed-efects Precision wls
Standard error 0.265 0.764 0.569 1.936***
(0.457) (0.628) (1.098) (0.331)
Squared standard error –0.866 2.958 –4.286 14.859**
(2.487) (4.914) (7.761) (4.795)
Global Financial Crisis 0.024 0.014 –0.028 –0.027 0.199 0.219 0.685*** 0.704***
(0.076) (0.069) (0.065) (0.059) (0.156) (0.153) (0.021) (0.023)
Legal history –0.022 –0.032 –0.017 –0.026 0.173 0.173 0.779*** 0.805***
(0.050) (0.052) (0.033) (0.033) (0.153) (0.148) (0.023) (0.022)
Big banks –0.024 –0.029 –0.015 –0.017 0.038 0.035 0.057 0.061
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.036) (0.036) (0.046) (0.046)
Commercial banks –0.012*** –0.014*** –0.008*** –0.008*** –0.012 –0.012 –0.041*** –0.043***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.021) (0.002) (0.004)
Industry classifications 0.140 0.133 0.070 0.074 0.285 0.295
(0.131) (0.133) (0.108) (0.110) (0.206) (0.202)
Multiple incomes –0.030 –0.033
(0.023) (0.028)
Real efects 0.015 0.027 0.020 0.028 –0.115 –0.095
(0.038) (0.038) (0.018) (0.017) (0.062) (0.064)
Static risk measure 0.143 0.145 0.071 0.070 0.236*** 0.241*** –0.098** –0.094**
(0.074) (0.069) (0.073) (0.070) (0.040) (0.040) (0.023) (0.027)
Cross-sectional –0.043 –0.040 –0.040 –0.029 –0.014 –0.011
(0.055) (0.055) (0.044) (0.041) (0.080) (0.080)
Endogeneity-controlled 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.077** 0.080** –0.004 0.003 0.101** 0.122***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.028) (0.029) (0.060) (0.060) (0.023) (0.018)
Constant –0.114 –0.101 –0.065 –0.049 –0.341** –0.342** –0.738*** –0.735***
(0.090) (0.088) (0.083) (0.084) (0.155) (0.151) (0.056) (0.057)
Observations 218 218 218 218 218 218 57 57
Adjusted R-squared 0.097 0.094 0.073 0.049 0.847 0.829
Combined efect 0.061** 0.070** 0.009 0.030 0.020 0.054 0.279** 0.333**
95% prediction interval ±0.051 ±0.048 ±0.053 ±0.046 ±0.111 ±0.102 ±0.020 ±0.024
Standard errors are in parentheses (cluster-robust for wls). Levels of 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***. Some variables 
are dropped because of collinearity issues.
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Efect on risk-adjusted profitability
df wls Mixed-efects Weighted average df wls Mixed-efects
2.134*** 0.567 8.534*** 2.927 5.759
(0.367) (0.961) (1.430) (3.842) (3.648)
23.348*** 0.537 79.278*** 69.262*** 81.195***
(3.018) (10.305) (1.674) (13.500) (4.412)
0.689*** 0.693*** 0.708*** 0.728*** –0.11 –0.144*** –0.103 –0.139*** –0.066 –0.146***
(0.016) (0.009) (0.134) (0.155) (0.050) (0.005) (0.049) (0.010) (0.198) (0.036)
0.764*** 0.743*** 0.805*** 0.837*** 0.151*** 0.027** 0.024 0.022 0.129 0.021
(0.032) (0.024) (0.146) (0.176) (0.040) (0.010) (0.105) (0.019) (0.150) (0.024)
0.078** 0.064** –0.021 –0.007 0.042 0.028** 0.021 0.021 0.037 0.035
(0.024) (0.014) (0.061) (0.087) (0.025) (0.011) (0.015) (0.012) (0.036) (0.033)
–0.040*** –0.039*** –0.045** –0.047**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.022) (0.022)
–0.108*** –0.121*** –0.109*** –0.120*** –0.083 –0.121***
(0.020) (0.002) (0.020) (0.004) (0.199) (0.036)
–0.017** –0.018 –0.022 –0.018
(0.005) (0.006) (0.064) (0.064)
–0.012 0.130*** –0.041 0.148***
(0.042) (0.013) (0.224) (0.045)
–0.111*** –0.109*** –0.105 –0.108 –0.077 –0.121***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.064) (0.064) (0.107) (0.016)
0.099** 0.095*** 0.091** 0.089 0.049 0.035** 0.061** 0.045*** 0.023 0.019
(0.023) (0.016) (0.044) (0.045) (0.021) (0.015) (0.023) (0.005) (0.032) (0.032)
–0.759*** –0.721*** –0.689*** –0.703*** –0.297*** –0.078*** –0.014 0.055 –0.221 –0.080***
(0.033) (0.021) (0.162) (0.193) (0.049) (0.003) (0.248) (0.028) (0.169) (0.019)
57 57 57 57 24 24 24 24 24 24
0.752 0.725 0.773 0.905 0.186 0.551
0.259** 0.286** 0.326** 0.345** –0.303** –0.142** –0.084 –0.090** –0.224** –0.158**
±0.024 ±0.017 ±0.081 ±0.082 ±0.082 ±0.014 ±0.146 ±0.023 ±0.190 ±0.039
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Table 3.10   Multiple meta-regression analysis for index efects
Efect on risk Efects on profitability
Precision wls df wls Mixed-efects Precision wls
Standard error –0.011 –0.293 –0.140 –1.572
(0.403) (0.362) (0.494) (0.723)
Squared standard error 1.549 –0.777 3.683 –10.015
(2.780) (3.069) (3.362) (6.016)
Global Financial Crisis –0.057*** –0.054** –0.057*** –0.056*** –0.036 –0.038 –0.099 –0.067
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.037) (0.036) (0.093) (0.102)
Legal history –0.074*** –0.076*** –0.074*** –0.072*** –0.097*** –0.093*** 0.075*** 0.099***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.011) (0.012) (0.035) (0.034) (0.017) (0.007)
Big banks 0.029 0.031 0.016 0.018 0.054** 0.050** 0.013 0.018
(0.020) (0.019) (0.012) (0.012) (0.022) (0.023) (0.015) (0.017)
Commercial banks 0.009** 0.010** 0.008** 0.008** 0.01 0.011 0.077*** 0.080***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.016)
Industry classifications –0.016 –0.015 –0.01 –0.011 –0.017 –0.019
(0.022) (0.024) (0.018) (0.018) (0.043) (0.042)
Multiple incomes –0.005 –0.004 –0.007 –0.006 0.026 0.028 0.221*** 0.227***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.049) (0.043)
Real efects 0.034** 0.031** 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033 0.028 0.062** 0.06
(0.012) (0.011) (0.007) (0.006) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.031)
Static risk measure –0.046 –0.050 –0.033 –0.034 –0.076*** –0.074***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.018) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
Cross-sectional –0.001 –0.002 –0.015 –0.015 0.03 0.025 –0.021 –0.007
(0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.029) (0.035) (0.042)
Endogeneity-controlled –0.100** –0.111** –0.090*** –0.094*** –0.158*** –0.154*** 0.018 0.001
(0.036) (0.039) (0.016) (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.037) (0.039)
Constant 0.120*** 0.124*** 0.121*** 0.116*** 0.141*** 0.135*** –0.068 –0.126**
(0.027) (0.032) (0.028) (0.027) (0.048) (0.047) (0.058) (0.049)
Observations 227 227 227 227 227 227 87 87
Adjusted R-squared 0.424 0.426 0.486 0.484 0.654 0.633
Combined efect –0.069** –0.075** –0.056** –0.065** –0.084** –0.089** –0.021 –0.049**
95% prediction interval ±0.030 ±0.023 ±0.017 ±0.014 ±0.027 ±0.024 ±0.028 ±0.030
Standard errors are in parentheses (cluster-robust for wls). Levels of 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***. Some variables 
are dropped because of collinearity issues.
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Efects on risk-adjusted profitability
df wls Mixed-efects Weighted average df wls Mixed-efects
–1.676 –0.677 0.467 0.703 –0.191
(1.062) (2.667) (1.113) (1.099) (1.119)
–15.558** 3.682 4.441 7.29 –3.21
(4.779) (12.359) (12.324) (13.916) (10.345)
0.092 0.095 –0.093*** –0.094*** –0.098*** –0.100*** –0.214*** –0.209**
(0.371) (0.352) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.082) (0.082)
0.224*** 0.228*** 0.119 0.134 –0.039 –0.043 –0.040 –0.046 –0.123 –0.117
(0.031) (0.034) (0.329) (0.309) (0.031) (0.024) (0.030) (0.025) (0.074) (0.075)
0.009 0.012 –0.009 –0.008 –0.001 –0.001 0.009 0.009 –0.009 –0.009
(0.007) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011) (0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
0.075*** 0.074*** 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.042 0.043 0.038 0.04 0.072*** 0.072***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.013) (0.013) (0.039) (0.038) (0.037) (0.036) (0.019) (0.019)
–0.085*** –0.085*** –0.086*** –0.086*** –0.103*** –0.103***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.022) (0.022)
0.267*** 0.259*** 0.039 0.039 0.011 0.01 0.006 0.005 0.007 0.007
(0.055) (0.031) (0.022) (0.022) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.016) (0.016)
0.048*** 0.042*** 0.095*** 0.095*** 0.036** 0.037** 0.033** 0.035** 0.048** 0.048**
(0.008) (0.007) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.021) (0.021)
–0.015 –0.015 –0.024 –0.026 –0.048 –0.045
(0.021) (0.020) (0.016) (0.014) (0.090) (0.090)
0.110*** 0.100*** 0.008 –0.006 –0.029** –0.029** –0.031*** –0.030*** –0.114 –0.114
(0.027) (0.026) (0.222) (0.217) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.008) (0.080) (0.079)
0.001 0.008 –0.125*** –0.125*** 0.022 0.022 0.001 0.002 –0.003 –0.002
(0.048) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
–0.195*** –0.225*** –0.153 –0.164 0.058 0.070 0.063 0.079** 0.227** 0.216
(0.034) (0.024) (0.349) (0.324) (0.059) (0.037) (0.053) (0.034) (0.116) (0.119)
87 87 87 87 146 146 146 146 146 146
0.81 0.807 0.374 0.372 0.477 0.474
–0.054** –0.072** –0.097 –0.101 –0.025 −0.016 –0.051** –0.038** –0.057 –0.060
±0.050 ±0.019 ±0.191 ±0.184 ±0.036 ±0.027 ±0.034 ±0.025 ±0.070 ±0.066
on risk-adjusted proftability, negative non-interest income effects on risk and
positive fee effects on risk adjusted proftability. The good practice sensitivity
analysis further supports the evidence for positive non-interest effects and
trading effects on proftability and for negative index effects on risk and risk
adjusted proftability.
3.6.4 Bonferroni adjustment for multiple hypothesis testing
Since existing studies differ in methods and scope, this meta-analysis pre-
sents its results separately for twelve kinds of genuine effects. Assessing the
signifcance of these twelve effects requires testing for twelve individual hy-
potheses. Such multiple hypotheses testing entails an increased risk of type i
errors. This risk is especially relevant for exploratory analyses without clear
a priori hypotheses, as is the case for meta-regression analyses. However, in
the present meta-regression analysis, validating results over multiple models
mitigates the risk of type i errors. Nonetheless, formally accounting for mul-
tiple hypothesis testing may be informative.
Perhaps the simplest and most widely used way to account for multiple hy-
pothesis testing is the Bonferroni adjustment: For a signifcance threshold of
 and n separate tests, the Bonferroni adjustment deems a score signifcant
only if the corresponding p-value is  (Noble 2009, 1136). However, the
downside is that Bonferroni adjusted levels of signifcance may be overly
conservative regarding type i errors at the cost of infated type ii errors
(Perneger 1998).
Applying the Bonferroni adjustment to the simple meta-regression analy-
sis renders those results insignifcant that are previously only signifcant at
the 10% level. All simple meta-regression results previously signifcant at
the 5% or 1% level remain signifcant on at least the 5% level. The adjust-
ment thus affects both occurrences where the precision estimate test and
the precision-effect estimate with standard errors correspond. Only corres-
ponding test results would provide robust evidence for genuine effects.
Thus, after the adjustment, all results from simple meta-regression analysis
are non-robust. The evidence for positive fee effects on proftability and neg-
ative trading effects on risk-adjusted proftability is thus weakened.
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In contrast, regarding the results from the multiple meta-regression analy-
sis, the Bonferroni adjustment has little effect. Most predictions would also
pass a higher threshold than the reported 95% level of confdence. All but
one of the previously signifcant best practice combined effects remain signif-
icant at the 95% level of confdence for at least four of the six model specifc-
ations. The exception is the prediction for non-interest income effects on
proftability. Without adjustment, four of the six model specifcations yield
signifcant positive results; with adjustment this is only the case for three
specifcations.
3.6.5 Overall appreciation of evidence for genuine efects
When considering the Bonferroni adjustment, there remains evidence for
genuine negative trading effects on risk-adjusted proftability and for posi-
tive trading effects on proftability. These two effects in combination support
the otherwise weak evidence for positive trading effects on risk. Further,
there is evidence for negative non-interest income effects and index effects on
risk. In combination with the evidence on positive trading effects on risk,
these observations support the otherwise weak evidence for negative fee ef-
fects on risk. For the remaining combinations of effects and performance
measures,  the meta-regression analysis yields, in summary, no clear evid-
ence.
The results for genuine effects are generally less clear for fee income than
for trading income. This lack of clarity could be due to the wider area of
business activities contributing to fee income in contrast to trading income.
The range of activities captured by fee income increases the unaccounted
heterogeneity of observed fee effects.
3.6.6 Moderators driving business model efects on performance
The sensitivity of combined effect predictions on assumed moderator pa-
rameter values raises the question of how individual moderator variables af-
fect the relations between diversifcation and bank performance. Tables 3.7
to 3.10 present the detailed results for the multiple meta-regressions. It
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includes several moderator variables to explicitly model the heterogeneity
among primary studies regarding samples and methods.
The coefficients of moderator variables generally describe how research
design can lead to different observed effects. However, the robustness of the
observed results is limited for most combinations of diversifcation and per-
formance measures. Tables 3.7 to 3.10 show that only few moderator vari-
ables are signifcantly and robustly correlated with the effect variable over
all six models. However, in combination with a check for consistent effects,
it seems plausible that some moderators contribute to the effects of diversi-
fcation. I thus interpret as evidence for moderator infuence results that are
signifcant over at least three of the six specifcations and consistent across
different performance and diversifcation measures.
The clearest evidence is observed for publication bias. The results show a
negative publication bias for fee effects on proftability. Standard error or
squared standard error are signifcantly negatively correlated with the effect
variable for three of the six models. In addition, three of the six multiple
meta-regression models show consistent evidence for a negative publication
bias regarding fee effects on risk-adjusted proftability. Regarding trading ef-
fects, the results indicate positive publication bias on proftability and risk-
adjusted proftability. In both cases, the evidence is robust over four of the
six models. In addition, the results from the multiple meta-regression analy-
sis match the fndings that the simple meta-regression analysis provides on
publication bias. This observation indicates that the existing empirical liter-
ature, on average, judges fees too critically and trading too favourably re-
garding effects on proftability and risk-adjusted proftability.
A consistent pattern is also observable for the endogeneity-controlled vari-
able. It contributes negatively to non-interest income effects on proftability in
all six specifcations. However, while evidence for infuences on fee effects
and index effects on proftability tend in the same direction, these results are
both only signifcant over two of the six specifcations. Endogeneity-
controlled further contributes negatively to fee effects and index effects on risk
in four and six specifcations. In contrast, this moderator’s contributions to
trading effects on proftability and risk are positive in four and three specifc-
ations. These results suggest that studies not accounting for endogeneity
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underestimate the riskiness and proftability of trading business. Also, the
results indicate that studies not accounting for endogeneity overestimate,
both, the proftability and riskiness of fee generating business. In combina-
tion, these observations lead to the counter-intuitive conclusion that not
controlling for endogeneity understates effect sizes. An explanation for this
observation could be that only authors who fnd clear effects can “afford”
instrumental variable approaches and maintain their signifcant results.
The results further provide some evidence that banks’ ability to beneft
from diversifcation depends on the legal history of their home country. Stud-
ies focusing on countries with a legal history of separating banking and se-
curities business are shown to fnd less positive non-interest income effects
on proftability in all six specifcations. This relation could be driven by fees,
as suggested by the negative contribution of legal history to fee effects on
proftability. However, this connection is only observed for two model spec-
ifcations. The contribution to trading effects on proftability is, in contrast,
positively affected by a legal history of separating banking from securities
business over all six models. So banks from countries with a legal history of
separating banking and securities business have more difficulties building a
proftable fee-based business. For trading activities, banks from such coun-
tries appear to be in a better position. A possible explanation might be that
in countries that used to restrict banks’ securities business, a more market-
based (in contrast to bank-based) fnancial system has developed.
Finally, studies focusing on big banks tend to fnd more positive fee effects
on proftability in three of the models and on risk-adjusted proftability in
six of them. Similarly, but with more limited robustness, two models indic-
ate positive trading effects on proftability and one model shows positive
trading effects on risk-adjusted proftability. These results suggest that larger
banks can more easily proft from diversifcation than smaller institutions.
However, the results for non-interest income effects and index effects do not
confrm this observation.
For the remaining moderator variables some signifcant contributions to
effects can be observed, but they do not provide a consistent picture. Clearer
patterns might become observable once the body of empirical literature has
grown further.
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3.7 conclusion
The idea of legally limiting banks’ engagement in securities business has re-
gained popularity after the Global Financial Crisis. However, the existing
empirical literature on bank income diversifcation provides no clear support
for such regulations. Neither evidence for nor against diversifcation clearly
dominates. The meta-regression analysis presented in this study investigates
this discord. The analysed literature includes thirty-four studies with a total
of 932 regressions. Based on this data set, the analysis aims at detecting the
genuine effects of income diversifcation and explaining the discord in the
literature.
The existing literature applies various approaches to measure diversifca-
tion and its effects. For diversifcation, most authors simply use the banks’
dependence on non-interest income as opposed to interest income. Other
authors separately measure the dependence on fees and trading income,
and yet others construct diversifcation indices assuming that equal shares
across all types of income correspond to maximum diversifcation. To meas-
ure effects on bank performance, existing studies assess risk, proftability or
risk-adjusted proftability. For the meta-regression analysis presented here,
the four measures of diversifcation and three measures of performance
provide twelve conceptually related measures of diversifcation effects. This
set-up allows consistency checks that are not possible for existing meta-
regression analyses in economics.
The results illustrate that whether empirical studies fnd positive or nega-
tive effects of diversifcation on performance depends critically on the stud-
ies’ research design. The evidence for underlying genuine effects observable
across the body of empirical literature is mixed. None of the results from this
meta-regression analysis is perfectly robust. The most solid evidence indic-
ates that diversifcation towards trading decreases risk-adjusted proftability.
Less robust evidence suggests that diversifcation towards trading increases
both proftability and risk. There is also evidence that diversifcation as
measured by the share of non-interest income and by constructed diversif-
cation indices reduces risk. Since fee income is the main component of such
diversifcation measures, these results support the otherwise weak evidence
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that diversifcation towards fee-generating activities decreases risk. How-
ever, the results are inconclusive regarding the effects of fee generating
activities on proftability and risk-adjusted proftability.
Meta-regression analysis suggests that the existing empirical literature, on
average, underestimates the benefcial effects of fee income on proftability
and risk-adjusted proftability because of publication bias. For the same
reason, the literature overestimates the positive effects of trading income on
proftability and underestimates the negative effects on risk-adjusted proft-
ability. Regarding proftability and risk-adjusted proftability, the literature
thus tends to judge fees too critically and trading too favourably.
The results provide some explanations for the discord in the existing em-
pirical literature. Studies not accounting for endogeneity underestimate the
riskiness of trading business. Larger banks are more successful in increasing
profts by expanding fee-generating activities and trading. Furthermore, the
legal history of some countries to separate banking and securities business
negatively affects the proftability of fee-generating activities but positively
affects the proftability of trading.
Overall, the meta-regression analysis provides some support for the gen-
eral political argument that trading business increases the risk of banks.
However, whether this observation calls for regulatory limitations to trading
activities remains questionable because some evidence suggests that larger
banks are more likely to proft from increased trading business. The results
further provide support for the popular strategy to expand fee-generating
activities, especially for large banks.
Future research should analyse individual types of fee income to capture
the sources of the heterogeneity present in existing empirical results. Doing
so could be helpful to gain more clarity on the effects of fee income on bank
performance.
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4Diversifcation and Performance
of Large Banks
In international policy debates after the Global Financial Crisis, proponents
of regulatory limits to banks’ investment banking activities referred to the
American Glass–Steagall Act (Uchitelle 2009). However, this still ongoing
policy debate is based on limited empirical grounds. Policy makers are
mainly concerned about the resilience of the largest banks because it is
these institutes that generate externalities when balancing their risk-return
profle. Nonetheless, existing studies on the effects of income diversifca-
tion do not focus on such banks but instead analyse heterogeneous samples.
It is thus unclear to what extent existing fndings can be conferred to large
banks.
In addition, there is discord in the existing literature on the effects of bank
income diversifcation. While some existing studies fnd trading activities to
increase risks and decrease risk-adjusted proftability (e.g. DeYoung and
Roland 2001; Stiroh 2004b), there are also notable reports of negative
effects on risk and positive effects on risk-adjusted profts (e.g. Lepetit et
al. 2008; Meslier, Tacneng and Tarazi 2014). Regarding the effects from
fee-generating activities, available empirical evidence draws an even less
conclusive picture (e.g. Kwan 1998 vs. Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
2010).
This study examines the effects of income diversifcation on the perform-
ance of large international banks, arguably the most relevant institutes for
the post-crisis policy debate. The study provides new insights by breaking
up fee income into detailed types of business activities. Only few existing
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studies are able to break up non-interest income in more categories than just
fee and trading income (e.g. Calmès and Théoret 2012; DeYoung and
Torna 2013). To obtain this level of detail, these studies utilize regulatory
data sets; however, available regulatory data are country-specifc and thus
prevent international comparisons. Such data limitations force existing
studies to include smaller banks in their samples to obtain sufficiently large
samples. Yet, fndings from such heterogeneous samples are not necessarily
conferrable to large international banks.
The present study focuses on large banks with over usd 100 billion in total
assets. Similar to the existing literature, I use income statement data on fee
and trading income for my analysis. To obtain more detailed information on
non-interest income, I combine this data with investment banking deal
volumes and assets under management. From annual reports and secondary
sources, I compile the most comprehensive panel of assets under manage-
ment data in the literature. The resulting sample consists of ninety interna-
tional banks over the years 2005 to 2015. As an additional improvement in
comparison to the existing literature I use the daily available Bloomberg De-
fault Risk indicator as dependent variable. This indicator has the advantage
that it is not based on return volatility and can thus exploit longitudinal
changes in risk.
The results indicate that banks with a more diversifed income struc-
ture generally have a lower default risk and higher proftability. Retail fee
income, trading income and income from syndicated loan underwriting
reduce banks’ default risk and increase their proftability. Equity underwrit-
ing, in contrast, increases default risk and decreases proftability and risk-
adjusted proftability. For diversifcation towards debt underwriting, merger
and acquisition services (M&A), and asset management, the analysis yields
no conclusive effects on bank performance. These fndings provide support
for bank strategies to increase fee income. However, the results cast doubts
on the effectiveness of limiting banks trading and investment banking activ-
ities as a mean to make large banks more resilient.
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4.1 data
This study is more focused on large banks and includes more detailed in-
formation on bank income than existing studies with international samples.
The following section discusses the sampled data and its sources.
4.1.1 Sample selection and data collection
Large and systemically important banks are arguably the most relevant insti-
tutes for the post-crisis policy debate. To balance focusing on large banks
and adequate sample size, this study includes banks with more than usd
100 billion in total assets. This criterion serves as an approximation for
banks’ systemic importance, which is not officially defned for the whole
sample period. Also, official defnitions of systemic importance vary be-
tween countries. The size criterion combined with data availability results
in an unbalanced panel of ninety listed banks with 979 annual data points
from 2003 to 2015. The length of individual time series varies from four to
thirteen years. However, because of the applied dynamic panel data analysis
with incorporated lags, the actual number of observations decreases to 799.
Table 4.9 in this chapter’s appendix on page 119 lists the included banks.
I mainly construct the panel from balance sheets and income statements
from Thomson Reuters’ Eikon. From this source I obtain data on fee and
trading income and investment banking deal volumes. In addition, I collect
data on assets under management from Pension & Investments’ annual asset
manager rankings and from banks’ annual reports. Data on default risk is
gathered from Bloomberg. Bank-specifc control variables are obtained from
Thomson Reuters’ Eikon, macroeconomic control variables from Thomson
Reuters’ Datastream.
The collected data set provides more detailed insights on international
banks’ income generating activities than available from the existing literat-
ure. The focus on large international banks increases the relevance for re-
cent and ongoing policy debates and improves the availability of detailed
data. Such a focus also reduces potentially unobservable heterogeneity in
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Table 4.1   Description of variables
Variable Description Source
Dependent variables
Default risk Natural logarithm of the annual maximum of the 
daily available one-year default probability from 
Bloomberg Default Risk (ranging from 0 to 1 before 
logarithmization) 
Bloomberg
Profitability Annual return on assets Eikon
Risk-adjusted profitability Annual return on assets times annual maximum of 
one-year default probability
Eikon, 
Bloomberg
Variables of interest
Non-interest diversification Index of diversification between interest income and 
combined non-interest income (i.e. fees and trading) 
based on each bank’s deviations from average reliance 
on each income type, scaled from 0 (minimum 
observed diversification) to 1 (market diversification, 
defined as maximum diversification)
Eikon
Detailed diversification Analogously constructed index of diversification 
between interest income and all individual non-
interest activities as listed below, scaled from 0 to 1
Eikon, P&I, 
annual reports
Fees Ratio of annual fee and commission income per total 
assets
Eikon
Trading Ratio of annual trading income per total assets Eikon
Equity Ratio of annual volume of equity deals per total 
assets
Eikon
Debt Ratio of annual volume of debt deals per total assets Eikon
Syndicated Loans Ratio of annual volume of syndicated loan deals per 
total assets
Eikon
M&A Ratio of annual volume of M&A deals per total assets Eikon
Asset management End-of-year assets under management per total 
assets
P&I,
annual reports
Control variables
Size Total assets in trillion usd Eikon
Leverage Ratio of total assets over total equity Eikon
Economic growth Annual gdp growth in bank’s home country in 
percent
Datastream
Interest rate End-of-year three-month treasury rate in bank’s home 
country in percent
Datastream
Where no unit is stated the variable is measured in units of one.
business models. Table 4.1 provides an overview of all used variables, their
defnitions and sources. Table 4.2 presents the summary statistics.
4.1.2 Measures of bank performance
I measure bank performance in terms of default risk, profitability and risk-
adjusted profitability. To measure default risk, I use the natural logarithm of
the Bloomberg Default Risk indicator. This indicator estimates the probabil-
ity of a default over the next year. It is based on proprietary, non-public risk
models incorporating market and fundamental data. The indicator offers
default risk estimates for public and private companies alike, which implies
that, in terms of market data, not only stock price volatility but also bond
spreads and spreads on credit default swaps (cds spreads) are factored in.
The index provides daily data. To convert this index to an annual fre-
quency like the rest of the data, I select the maximum index values of each
bank and year. Doing so allows exploiting the index’s intra-year variance,
while simply using end-of-year values would forgo available information. I
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Table 4.2   Summary statistics
Mean Median Min. Max.
Within
std. dev.
Between
std. dev.
Overall
std. dev.
Risk –3.712 –3.840 –4.935 –0.412 0.425 0.437 0.579
Profitability 0.009 0.009 –0.041 0.068 0.006 0.007 0.009
Risk-adjusted profitability 0.009 0.009 –0.039 0.067 0.006 0.007 0.009
Non-interest diversification 0.976 0.995 0.000 1.000 0.062 0.070 0.096
Detailed diversification 0.996 0.999 0.802 1.000 0.008 0.012 0.014
Fees 0.010 0.008 –0.011 0.051 0.003 0.007 0.007
Trading 0.012 0.007 –0.011 0.127 0.010 0.015 0.018
Debt 0.036 0.016 0.000 0.907 0.025 0.065 0.065
Equity 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.100 0.006 0.009 0.011
Syndicated Loans 0.029 0.010 0.000 0.596 0.031 0.043 0.050
M&A 0.086 0.008 0.000 1.790 0.096 0.189 0.215
Asset management 0.584 0.265 0.000 16.289 0.419 1.260 1.435
Size 0.808 0.469 0.062 3.675 0.239 0.733 0.763
Leverage 19.166 17.267 6.722 71.733 5.015 7.342 8.944
Economic growth 2.173 2.010 –5.620 26.280 2.367 2.540 3.089
Interest rate 3.764 3.570 –0.069 16.490 1.241 2.029 2.407
use the natural logarithm to obtain a more normally distributed default risk
variable.
The chosen default risk indicator is more responsive to changes in risk
than alternative indicators measuring risk based on income volatility. The
most popular risk indicator in the literature is the Z-score, which measures
the number of standard deviations that profts must fall to wipe out a bank’s
equity (e.g. Lown et al. 2000; Stiroh 2004b; Sanya and Wolfe 2011).
This indicator is defned as:
(4.1)
with the standard deviation  being calculated over the whole
sample period. However, using the standard deviation of net income over
the sample period is, in my opinion, problematic for longitudinal analyses
and it is also criticized in the literature (Lepetit and Strobel 2013).
Measured this way, income volatility remains constant over time. Any longi-
tudinal changes in the Z-score are thus driven by changes in leverage or
proftability. Since the Z-score does not capture changes in income volatility,
this index is ill-suited for assessing the risk effects of income diversifcation.
Using Bloomberg Default Risk avoids this problem.
The selected default risk variable is preferable to purely market-based risk
indicators. It offers a better measurement of default probability than stock
price volatility and is available for more banks and over more years than
cds or bond spreads.
As a second dependent variable, I use profitability, defned as pre-tax re-
turn on assets, as reported by Thompson Reuter’s Eikon. Furthermore, I in-
clude risk-adjusted profitability as the dependent variable. This variable is
constructed as the product of pre-tax return on assets and the converse
probability of a default over the next year as estimated by the Bloomberg
Default Risk indicator (which is not logarithmized here).
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4.1.3 Measures of diversification in individual income types
In the existing empirical literature, there are two general approaches to
measure income diversifcation of banks: through a comprehensive index
(e.g. Altunbas, Manganelli and Marques-Ibanez 2011) or by sepa-
rately assessing a bank’s reliance on individual income types other than tra-
ditional interest income (e.g. Köhler 2015). Thereby, diversifcation indices
usually include multiple measures of individual income types as building
blocks. In a frst step I therefore discuss the measures of individual income
types included in this study.
I follow DeYoung and Torna (2013) to construct the variables fees and
trading by normalizing the respective income statement fgures by total as-
sets. Dividing by total assets serves as a proportional approximation for the
actual return on assets of each business activity. This exact measure cannot
be calculated due to the divisor being unknown. Other authors (e.g. Sanya
and Wolfe 2011; Köhler 2015) normalize individual income streams by
total operating income. However, this approach causes troubles if the in-
come becomes zero or negative. Dividing by total assets avoids such prob-
lems and seems more intuitive.
Fees and trading in combination are only an unsatisfactory proxy for in-
vestment banking activities. In particular, the fees variable not only measures
income that stems from various investment banking activities but also from
other banking areas. DeYoung and Rice (2004, 47) show for American
banks with over usd 25 billion of total assets that, apart from fee income re-
lated to investment banking business, the major proportion of fee income is
related to asset management: Investment banking and securitization fees
together account for 40% of attributable fee income, and fduciary and de-
posit fees for 54%.6 More information on fee income is thus necessary to
identify the share of fee income that is related to investment banking.
6 The source lists subtypes of fee income together with other types of non-
interest income. To calculate the stated percentages, venture capital income, 
gains on asset sales and insurance related income were excluded because 
they are not included in the fee income data used in the present study.
data 95
Diferent activities 
contribute to fees
Fees and trading
per total assets
To analyse bank income in more detail than found in the existing literat-
ure, I include data to individually measure fve subcategories of fee income.
Namely, I include investment banking fees from equity, debt, syndicated
loans, and M&A deals, and fees from asset management. For investment
banking, I use data on deal volumes from Eikon’s League Tables, normalized
by total assets, to approximate individual types of investment banking fee
income.
For asset management activities, assets under management data, normal-
ized by total assets, serve as a proxy for the related fee income. Since assets
under management are not on banks’ balance sheets, accounting standards
do not require banks to report this data. Consequently, availability of data
on assets under management is patchy and varies between banks and years.
Assembling a substantial data set of assets under management information
thus requires compiling data from various sources. I collect most assets
under management data from Pensions & Investments’ survey-based annual
asset manager rankings. Further data are collected from banks’ voluntary
disclosures in annual reports. If data from Pensions & Investment and from
annual reports only yield incomplete time series for an individual bank, I
combine the time series if they overlap and match during the overlapping
periods. If the overlapping time series for a bank diverge, I scale the shorter
segment to match the longer segment. Banks change their reporting format
considerably over time. If combining assets under management from annual
reports results in inexplicable jumps, I drop the suspicious observations.
Since assets under management usually evolve relatively steadily over time,
I fll missing values between available years from consistent sources with
linear interpolation. This concerns 12 of 799 data points. I do not, however,
extrapolate any missing values.
4.1.4 Diversification indices
Measuring banks’ reliance on certain activities does not directly enable con-
clusions on the effects of diversifcation. If a bank has a very low share of
non-interest income, we could argue that expanding non-interest income
activities constitutes an increase in diversifcation. But large international
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banks tend to generate relatively high shares of non-interest income. For
such banks it is not a priori clear if increasing non-interest income activities
refects increasing or decreasing diversifcation. Also, it is unclear how shifts
between non-interest income activities affect the level of diversifcation.
Constructing a diversifcation index solves this problem. In the literature
(e.g. Stiroh 2006; Goddard, McKillop and Wilson 2008), a popular
approach for constructing diversifcation indices is based on a reversed
Herfndahl concentration index:
(4.2)
where operating income is defned as the sum of interest income and non-
interest income. An analogous index can be derived for more than two in-
come types (e.g. Mercieca, Schaeck and Wolfe 2007; Sanya and
Wolfe 2011).
In my opinion, this approach bears two disadvantages: First, the approach
implies that under maximum diversifcation each income type has the same
size. This assumption is not necessarily true from a portfolio theory per-
spective. And assuming so becomes more problematic if, like in this study,
multiple income categories and subcategories are analysed. Second, the ap-
proach implies an arbitrary maximum level of diversifcation if different
income types are measured in different units. By using business volumes
as proxies for related fee income, I assume that fees from each business line
are the product of a constant but unknown multiplier and the respective
business volume. However, this constant and unknown multiplier is different
for each income type. Defning maximum diversifcation as an even split of
income types would thus be arbitrary because the unknown units of meas-
urement are different across income types. Herfndahl indices thus bear seri-
ous disadvantages for measuring diversifcation.
To avoid these disadvantages, I construct my indices borrowing from
the approach of Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005) for measuring
industry concentration of investment portfolios. I construct two indices
to measure diversifcation between interest and non-interest income (non-
interest diversification) and to measure diversifcation between all available
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individual types of income (detailed diversification). For measuring detailed
diversification, the described disadvantages of Herfndahl indices are partic-
ularly relevant. So this index is discussed frst. Applying an index for in-
dustry concentration of investment portfolios to the concentration within fee
income results in:
(4.3)
where each bias describes the difference between the actual value of the in-
come subtype and its expected value, that is, its arithmetic mean. To pre-
vent arbitrary weighting of the different income types, I standardize the
different bias-components to a common scale by dividing them by their
standard deviation. In the example of income from interests, the bias is thus
constructed as:
(4.4)
where interest incomeb,t is the volume of debt investment banking deals of
bank b at time t, normalized by the bank’s total assets in the same year, and
interest income is the arithmetic mean of the normalized volume over all
banks and periods. The devisor  is the standard deviation of the
normalized volume of interest income. The other income subcategory biases
are constructed analogously.
Following the usage of the Herfndahl indices in the literature, I convert
the concentration index into a diversifcation index which results in:
(4.5)
where dividing by the sample maximum rescales detailed diversification to
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lie within a 0 to 1 range. The resulting index now has the same range like
reversed Herfndahl indices but avoids their disadvantages.
A second index measures non-interest diversification, that is, diversifcation
between interest income and non-interest income, the latter comprising fees
and trading income. These components all have the same unit of measure.
Constructing a reversed Herfndahl index would therefore be possible. None-
theless, a traditionally constructed index would still have the disadvantage
that it assumes equally sized income types as maximum diversifcation.
Thus, and for the sake of consistency, I construct non-interest diversification
in the same way as detailed diversification. A diversifcation index construc-
ted this way corresponds to a reversed Herfndahl index if the arithmetic
means of the two income types were each 50% of total operating income.
4.1.5 Control variables
I include several bank-specifc and macroeconomic control variables that
can be expected to affect, both, performance and income diversifcation of
banks. Their omission could lead to omitted variable bias. The included vari-
ables are frequently controlled for in the existing literature (e.g. Demirgüç -
Kunt and Huizinga 2010; Sanya and Wolfe 2011; DeYoung and Torna
2013).
Size is measured as total assets in trillion usd. A bank’s size might affect
the extent to which a bank decides to diversify its income. Certain business
areas might require a certain minimum volume and thus minimum bank
size in order to be viable. At the same time, the size variable can affect bank
performance. Larger banks may face reduced default probability because
government support preventing bankruptcy is more likely (Penas and Unal
2004). Possible economies of scale may also cause larger banks to be more
proftable. We thus expect size to have a negative effect on default risk and a
positive effect on proftability and risk-adjusted proftability.
Leverage describes the leverage ratio, that is, total assets per total equity.
A high leverage can constrain a bank’s diversifcation options for regula-
tory reasons. Leverage also affects a bank’s default risk because a higher
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proportion of equity capital better absorbs shocks from declining asset val-
ues (Lehar 2005, 2579). Leverage should thus be positively correlated with
default risk. In addition, poorly capitalized banks need to operate more
prudently which can decrease profitability (i.e. return on assets).
I further include macroeconomic variables to control for infuences stem-
ming from the economic situation in a bank’s home country.7 Economic
growth describes the growth in gdp over the previous year in percent. A
growing economy offers more attractive diversifcation options to banks
than a contracting economy, in which banks and other frms might have to
focus on what they do best. In contrast, a growing economy creates larger
business volumes and lowers default rates on investments. We can thus ex-
pect banks to have lower default risk and higher profitability if economic
growth is higher.
As another macroeconomic control I include interest rate, measured as the
home country’s end-of-year three-month treasury rate in percent. As experi-
enced after the Global Financial Crisis, an expansionary monetary policy
may depress banks’ interest margins. Depressed interest margins may negat-
ively affect bank proftability. However, not all bank activities are affected
equally. Namely fee income should be less affected. Accordingly, the interest
rate can have an effect on banks’ decision to engage more in fee-generating
activities. Interest rate is thus a confounding factor for bank performance
and income diversifcation and must be controlled.
In addition to the above discussed control variables, global macro-
economic developments are accounted for through the inclusion of year
dummies. Bank dummies, in contrast, are unnecessary because unob-
served time-invariant effects are cancelled out with the selected estimation
method, as described in the next section.
7 Because of the low number of sample banks per country, the inclusion of 
country-year fixed efects would be an ineficient alternative to address the 
macroeconomic influences.
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4.2 methods
The choice of method for this study is largely driven by the need to account
for possible endogeneity of a bank’s diversifcation decision. Diversifcation
may not only infuence bank performance; bank performance may also be a
relevant factor for the management decision whether to diversify more or
less. Existing studies identify the need to control for such endogeneity
(Stiroh and Rumble 2006, 2145–2146; Baele, De  Jonghe and Vander
Vennet 2007, 2009). When using an ordinary least squares estimator in the
presence of endogeneity, past shocks to the dependent variable can cause a
correlation between the dependent variable and the error term. Such a cor-
relation leads to dynamic panel bias (Nickell 1981). Also, if shocks are not
explicitly modelled, they remain embedded in the error term and infuence
subsequent observations. Such autocorrelation is a violation of the assump-
tions for consistent ordinary least squares estimators.
4.2.1 System Generalized Method of Moments
In the recent empirical literature on bank activity diversifcation it has be-
come standard practice to account for endogeneity by applying system gen-
eralized method of moments (gmm) estimation (e.g. Sanya and Wolfe
2011; Meslier, Tacneng and Tarazi 2014; Köhler 2015). This approach
has been developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and explicitly incorpor-
ates dynamic effects from the dependent variable from one period to an-
other.
System gmm is suitable for panels with fewer periods than individuals and
with endogenous explanatory variables, such as the dataset of this study.
The approach facilitates the search for instrumental variables since it allows
for the use of internal instruments that are built from past observations of
regressors and the dependent variable (Roodman 2009a, 100).
System gmm combines two equations. The frst is expressed in differences
to the previous period:
(4.6)
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where suitable lags of the dependent variable and of explanatory variables
are used as instruments. The term yi,t is the dependent variable default risk,
profitability or risk-adjusted profitability for each bank i in period t. The
lagged variable yi,t–1 is the same measure observed in the previous period.
The vector  represents all additional explanatory variables, including the
variables of interest, control variables and year dummies. The error term 
is independent across banks (Roodman 2009a, 104).
The second equation is specifed in levels:
(4.7)
where  describes unobserved bank specifc effects (Roodman 2009a, 100;
Sanya and Wolfe 2011, 82).
Under system gmm, unobserved time-invariant effects need not be ac-
counted for by including fxed-effects dummies. Under this estimation
method, all instruments for the levels equation are assumed to be ortho-
gonal to fxed effects and other time-invariant variables. Including bank
fxed-effects dummies, and thus removing fxed effects from the error terms,
does not affect the moments that are the basis for identifcation. Bank fxed
effects therefore do not affect the coefficient estimates for other regressors
(Roodman 2009a, 115).
4.2.2 Specification choices
System gmm offers many specifcation choices. Following Roodman (2009a,
129), I report all specifcation choices. General specifcation choices are re-
ported in the following subsection; specifcation choices for individual
model variants are reported in the result tables.
I apply a one-step estimator because evidence suggests this estimator to be
more reliable than the two-step version for panels with fewer than hundred
individuals (Soto 2009, 9). The reported standard errors are cluster-robust
to heteroskedasticity and to arbitrary patterns of autocorrelation within indi-
viduals. I include year dummies to account for global economic develop-
ments. Including year dummies is also recommended by Roodman (2009a,
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128) because doing so reduces the probability of correlation in idiosyncratic
differences, which would violate a basic assumption of system gmm.
Following Roodman (2009a, 128), I include every regressor into the in-
strument matrix. In accordance with Köhler (2015), I thereby treat all
bank-specifc variables as potentially endogenous and other variables as
strictly exogenous. Potentially endogenous variables are included in the in-
strument matrix as gmm-style instruments; strictly exogenous variables are
included as standard instrumental variables.
There is a danger in system gmm of including too many instrumental vari-
ables. Including too many instruments can overft endogenous variables,
weaken the power of diagnostic tests to detect invalid instruments and bias
regression coefficients. While a strict rule does not exist, Roodman (2009a,
99) proposes, as a rule of thumb, that the instrument count should not ex-
ceed the number of individuals. To keep the instrument count sufficiently
low I use a combination of instrument lag truncation and collapsing of the
instrument matrix to one column. Subject to this condition, I select the com-
bination that yields the best overall diagnostic test results for each regres-
sion.
4.2.3 Diagnostic tests
Roodman (2009b) warns of the risk of system gmm leading to invalid
results that appear valid. He consequently emphasizes the importance of
thorough diagnostic tests. I follow his recommendation as to which tests to
perform.
The most important diagnostic is the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for
autocorrelation in the residuals. It allows checking for frst-order serial cor-
relation in the levels equation (i.e. equation 4.7) by looking for second-order
serial correlation in the differenced equation (i.e. equation 4.6). If the null
hypothesis of no second-order correlation cannot be rejected, a higher lag of
the dependent variable must be included. In this case, a test for second-
order serial correlation in the levels equation and third-order serial correla-
tion in the differenced equation is needed. The lag structure may be further
increased until auto correlation in the residuals can be ruled out.
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I also report the Hansen (1982) J-test to avoid endogenous instruments.
The tests’ null hypothesis of exogenous instruments refers to all instru-
ments collectively. A low p-value means that the instruments are not exoge-
nous and do not satisfy the orthogonality condition. Here, Roodman (2007,
10–11) recommends not to be complacent with rejecting the null hypotheses
at conventional signifcance levels of 5% or 10%. While these thresholds are
conservative when deciding on the signifcance of a coefficient, they are lib-
eral when ruling out correlation between instruments and the error term.
Roodman recommends a minimum p-value of 25% instead.
Closely related to the J-test for validity of the full instrument set is the
C-test, also called difference-in-Hansen test. This test checks the exogeneity
of instrument subsets by computing the increase in the J-test if a subset is
added to the estimation. Following Roodman (2009b, 158), I perform the
Hansen C-tests for the full set of instruments for the levels equation and for
the subset based on the dependent variable.
4.2.4 Robustness checks
Researchers have considerable discretion regarding the specifcation choices
of system gmm. If diagnostics are not convincing, Roodman (2009b, 140)
therefore recommends testing the estimates for robustness to reducing the
instrument set.
Regarding robustness checks for an analysis that initially includes the full
instrument set, this recommendation is relatively clear: The researcher
should limit the instrument range or collapse the instrument matrix to a
single column. However, for the data set used in this study, Roodman’s re-
commendation is less clear. The panel is relatively long, which causes the
number of unrestricted instruments to be large in comparison to the number
of banks. I thus truncate the lag range and collapse the instrument matrix to
limit the number of instruments to the number of banks (see subsection
4.2.2 on specifcation choices). The only traditional way to further and
meaningfully reduce instruments would be to collapse all lagged instru-
ments and truncate them to only one period. Doing so would forgo a consid-
erable amount of information.
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Bontempi and Mammi (2015) present a way for more compelling robust-
ness checks. The authors propose a principal component analysis of the in-
strument matrix to shrink the instruments into a set of linear combinations
of the original variables. The weights used in such orthogonal combinations
refect the contribution of each variable to the observed total variability. The
resulting principal component analysis scores (pca scores) are then used as
instruments. In comparison to lag truncation and collapsing the instrument
matrix, principal component analysis has the advantage of exploiting in-
formation from the whole set of instruments to select the lags that contrib-
ute most to total variability. The instrument count can be reduced while less
available information is lost than in the case of traditional lag truncation and
collapsing of the instrument matrix.
For each presented regression, I conduct a principal component analysis
on the set of included variables. When computing the score, I retain the
principal components that, in sum, account for at least 90% of the variabil-
ity in the original data. This value is the default criterion suggested by
Bontempi and Mammi (2015, 1081). I include the scores as instruments in
the initial system gmm model, in place of the lagged bank-specifc variables.
For reference, I include for each regression a variant with principal compon-
ent analysis where I keep a similar instrument count. Subsequently and to
check the results’ robustness to reduced instrument counts, I include vari-
ants where the instrument count is reduced as much as possible: The scores
are collapsed and truncated to just the second lag. The dependent variable
instrument is collapsed and truncated to the frst lag. The exogenous re-
gressors remain as traditional instrumental variables. This procedure nearly
halves the instrument count.
4.3 results
The results indicate that banks with a more diversifed income structure
tend to have a lower default risk, higher profitability and higher risk-
adjusted profitability. Evidence suggests that the average sample bank could
reduce its default risk and increase profitability by increasing fee-generating
business other than investment banking and asset management. Also by
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increasing trading activities, the average sample bank could improve profit-
ability and risk-adjusted profitability. Note that the results for the control
variables are synoptically discussed at the end of this section, in subsection
4.3.3.
4.3.1 Diversification lowers risk and increases profitability
The regression results for the effects of diversifcation on default risk are
presented in Table 4.3. Columns (1) to (3) show the results for non-interest
diversification. Columns (4) to (6) use the detailed diversification index,
which includes diversifcation towards investment banking and asset man-
agement activities. The results consistently indicate that, both, non-interest
diversification and detailed diversification lower default risk.
To interpret the economic signifcance of the estimated coefficients we
have to remember how the diversifcation indices are constructed: Index
value 1 describes the average income structure off all banks and index value
0 describes the income structure of the least diversifed observed bank. A
one-unit increase in diversifcation describes a bank moving from the very
bottom of the diversifcation ranking to the very top. A one-unit increase
would be an exceptional, but nonetheless plausible, increase in diversifca-
tion. It would decrease the bank’s log-probability of default by –1.533,
based on the estimate from column (1). This equals a reduction in default
probability by 88%. We can thus regard the decrease in default risk associ-
ated to diversifcation as economically signifcant.
Columns (1) and (4) show the main results with the standard approach
to instrument selection where the lags of potentially endogenous regressors
serve as instruments. Their lag ranges are limited and matrices collapsed
to the extent necessary to push the instrument count below the number of
banks. While all Hansen tests yield insignifcant results, some do not pass
Roodman’s (2007, 10–11) rule of thumb threshold of a 0.25 p-value. So,
checking the coefficients’ robustness to reducing the instrument count ap-
pears recommendable. To preserve available information while reducing
the instrument count I use pca scores as instruments. As an intermediate
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step for reference, columns (2) and (5) present the results based on such
instruments without signifcantly reducing the instrument count. Columns
(3) and (6) present the results for fully truncated and collapsed instru-
ments to lower the instrument count. Columns (3) and (6) expectedly
perform poorly in the Hansen tests. However, the estimated coeffcients
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Table 4.3   Efects of diversification on risk
Risk
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1st lag of regressand 0.849*** 0.833*** 0.546*** 0.712*** 0.761*** 0.279**
(0.115) (0.081) (0.146) (0.098) (0.091) (0.120)
2nd lag of regressand –0.414*** –0.163*** –0.387*** –0.472*** –0.170*** –0.450***
(0.098) (0.038) (0.088) (0.109) (0.037) (0.118)
Non-interest diversification –1.533*** –0.845*** –2.658***
(0.403) (0.234) (0.641)
Detailed diversification –2.413*** –1.278*** –4.236***
(0.309) (0.256) (0.469)
Size –0.068 –0.008 –0.058 –0.096* –0.018 –0.104
(0.054) (0.043) (0.052) (0.058) (0.044) (0.063)
Leverage –0.012 –0.012 –0.007 –0.007 –0.008 0.006
(0.010) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008) (0.007)
Economic growth –0.044*** –0.035*** –0.057*** –0.049*** –0.037*** –0.066***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Interest rate –0.052*** –0.027* –0.066*** –0.022 –0.006 –0.006
(0.016) (0.015) (0.022) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019)
Chi-squared 570*** 1046*** 380*** 464*** 746*** 352***
Number of instruments 88 87 48 88 87 48
Lag range of regressand 1–1 1–3 1–1 1–1 1–3 1–1
Collapsed No No Yes No No Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–5 2–5
Collapsed Yes Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–2 2–2 2–2 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.468 0.290 0.779 0.550 0.291 0.674
Hansen’s J-test 0.128 0.145 0.022 0.131 0.156 0.009
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.074 0.014 0.008 0.143 0.011 0.028
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.477 0.188 0.213 0.631 0.298 0.278
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
qualitatively match the results from the standard system gmm model. The
robustness check of reducing the instrument count thus supports the ob-
served results.
Note that all models include two lags of the dependent variable as explan-
atory variables. The additional lag addresses second-order serial correlation
observed in several single-lag versions of these models and in models includ-
ing other dependent variables (not reported). Third-order autocorrelation
can be ruled out for all models. Including two lags of the dependent variable
reduces the number of observations to 799, since two sample years are lost
to lagging.
In table 4.4, we see the effects of diversifcation on profitability. Analog-
ously to the results on default risk, columns (7) to (9) show the results for
non-interest diversification and columns (10) to (12) those for detailed diver-
sification. Columns (7) and (10) show the main results for standard system
gmm. Columns (8) and (11) show the variant with pca scores but without
signifcantly reduced instrument count. The instrument counts are signifc-
antly reduced in columns (9) and (12). All results except for column (9)
indicate signifcant positive diversifcation effects on profitability. The estim-
ated coefficients may appear rather small. However, the summary statistics
in table 4.2 indicate that the median bank has return on assets of less than
1%. If an exceptional but plausible one-unit increase in diversifcation in-
creases return on assets by 1 percentage point, we must regard this result
as economically signifcant.
Hansen diagnostics are insignifcant for the two system gmm models in
columns (7) and (10), but do not satisfy the 0.25 p-value rule of thumb.
However, except for the aforementioned column (9), the robustness checks
with pca scores instrumentation and reduced instrument counts confrm the
initial result. Third-order autocorrelation can be ruled out for all results.
Table 4.5 shows the effects of diversifcation on risk-adjusted profitability.
Similar to the previously discussed tables, columns (13) to (15) show the
results for non-interest diversification and columns (16) to (18) for detailed
diversification. Columns (13) and (16) show the main results for standard
system gmm, the other columns robustness checks with pca scores instru-
mentation and reduced instrument count.
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Analysing the effects on risk-adjusted profitability mainly serves to double-
check the previous results on default risk and profitability. The results on
risk-adjusted profitability are consistent with previous results and indicate a
robust positive association with diversifcation.
The main results from columns (13) and (16) exhibit insignifcant Hansen
diagnostics. However, as before, these tests do not fulfl the 0.25 p-value rule
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Table 4.4   Efects of diversification on profitability
Profitability
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
1st lag of regressand –0.247*** 0.098* –0.328*** –0.291*** –0.025 –0.361***
(0.071) (0.054) (0.085) (0.064) (0.061) (0.073)
2nd lag of regressand –0.075 –0.023 –0.354** –0.114 –0.122* –0.380***
(0.096) (0.062) (0.148) (0.082) (0.068) (0.140)
Non-interest diversification 0.010*** 0.003 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Detailed diversification 0.016*** 0.015*** 0.018***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Size 0.003*** 0.001 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Leverage –0.0006*** –0.0001 –0.0006*** –0.0008*** –0.0008*** –0.0009***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Economic growth 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0016*** 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Interest rate 0.0014*** 0.0011*** 0.0022*** 0.0010*** 0.0007*** 0.0016***
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0004)
Chi-squared 570*** 1046*** 380*** 464*** 746*** 352***
Number of instruments 90 87 48 84 87 48
Lag range of regressand 1–11 1–3 1–1 1–5 1–6 1–1
Collapsed Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–6 2–6
Collapsed Yes Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–2 2–2 2–4 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.970 0.669 0.238 0.970 0.786 0.312
Hansen’s J-test 0.207 0.205 0.015 0.133 0.200 0.014
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.136 0.053 0.000 0.113 0.033 0.000
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.191 0.102 0.220 0.193 0.153 0.194
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
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of thumb. But the conducted robustness checks lead to qualitatively identi-
cal coefficients. Third-level autocorrelation is ruled out for all results.
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Table 4.5   Efects of diversification on risk-adjusted profitability
Risk-adjusted profitability
(13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18)
1st lag of regressand –0.184** 0.080 –0.313*** –0.218*** 0.042 –0.350***
(0.074) (0.063) (0.092) (0.067) (0.064) (0.080)
2nd lag of regressand –0.101 –0.052 –0.419*** –0.136 –0.093 –0.458***
(0.112) (0.093) (0.145) (0.093) (0.079) (0.120)
Non-interest diversification 0.009** 0.007** 0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Detailed diversification 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.017***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Size 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Leverage –0.0005*** –0.0004*** –0.0005*** –0.0007*** –0.0007*** –0.0008***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Economic growth 0.0013*** 0.0011*** 0.0015*** 0.0012*** 0.0010*** 0.0015***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Interest rate 0.0014*** 0.0009*** 0.0022*** 0.0010*** 0.0006*** 0.0017***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003)
Chi-squared 581*** 1232*** 440*** 504*** 966*** 416***
Number of instruments 90 89 46 90 89 46
Lag range of regressand 1–11 1–11 1–1 1–11 1–11 1–1
Collapsed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–6 2–6
Collapsed Yes Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–4 2–2 2–4 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.591 0.995 0.083 0.639 0.985 0.113
Hansen’s J-test 0.213 0.161 0.010 0.203 0.149 0.010
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.149 0.066 0.001 0.169 0.083 0.001
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.205 0.067 0.154 0.169 0.215 0.119
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
4.3.2 Results on individual bank activities
The discussed indices measure diversifcation in a non-linear way and based
on the assumption that the average portfolio of income generating activities
represents maximum diversifcation. This raises the question whether the
average sample bank could improve its performance by deviating from the
average mix of bank activities. As in the previous result tables, the sub-
sequent tables frst present the main results with standard system gmm
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Table 4.6   Efects of individual business activities on risk
Risk
(19) (20) (21)
1st lag of regressand 0.907*** (0.123) 0.844*** (0.067) 0.668*** (0.096)
2nd lag of regressand –0.242** (0.112) –0.088* (0.052) –0.135 (0.082)
Fees –28.043*** (8.160) –12.809* (7.751) –45.506*** (17.567)
Trading –2.498 (2.113) –6.873** (3.090) 0.768 (4.507)
Debt 0.102 (0.435) 0.554 (1.000) –0.705 (1.510)
Equity 6.220* (3.237) 4.442 (4.544) 15.647 (10.382)
Syndicated loans –1.841** (0.842) –2.232 (1.549) –5.348 (4.185)
M&A 0.038 (0.222) 0.051 (0.251) 0.867 (0.687)
Asset management –0.038 (0.098) –0.065 (0.075) –0.143 (0.240)
Size –0.005 (0.062) 0.005 (0.059) 0.048 (0.084)
Leverage –0.040*** (0.012) –0.032*** (0.011) –0.058*** (0.013)
Economic growth –0.043*** (0.009) –0.031*** (0.008) –0.061*** (0.013)
Interest rate –0.009 (0.013) 0.004 (0.013) –0.017 (0.020)
Chi-squared 25856*** 40779*** 16316***
Number of instruments 88 87 48
Lag range of regressand 1–1 1–3 1–1
Collapsed No No Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–5
Collapsed Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–2 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.221 0.269 0.554
Hansen’s J-test 0.212 0.184 0.003
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.205 0.032 0.001
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.444 0.471 0.837
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
instrumentation and then the robustness checks with pca scores instru-
mentation with and without reduced instrument count.
Table 4.6 presents the effects of individual non-interest bank activities on
default risk. We observe a robust negative effect of fees on default risk. The
coefficient of –28.043 suggests that a 1% increase in fee income per total as-
sets decreases the average sample bank’s default probability by 12%. Note
that this effect is controlled for fee generating activities in investment bank-
ing and asset management. We can thus conclude that the observed risk-
reducing  effects  stem from other  fee-generating  activities  such as  retail
fees.
For other bank activities, the evidence is less clear. We observe some evi-
dence that trading and syndicated loans business decrease default risk. These
fndings are non-robust but we can at least conclude that there is no evi-
dence for the hypothesis that trading or syndicated loans increase risk. Also
for debt and M&A deals we observe no evidence of increased default risk as
all coefficients are insignifcant. Likewise, the results are insignifcant for
asset management activities and therefore do not support the hypothesis
that asset management fees reduce the default risk of banks.
For equity deals we fnd some non-robust evidence of positive effects on
default risk. While these non-robust results must be interpreted with care,
they could be explained by equity generally being a riskier asset class than
debt securities. This difference could affect banks’ default risk if they con-
duct securities underwriting on a frm-commitment basis. For this business,
instead of earning fees, banks accept securities for an agreed price and place
them on the  market  at  their  own risk  (Saunders and Cornett 2011,
109).
As in previous results, the Hansen test diagnostics are insignifcant and rel-
atively good for the main results in column (19). Third-order autocorrela-
tion is ruled out for all results.
Table 4.7 presents the effects of individual non-interest bank activities on
profitability. We observe robust evidence of positive effects from fees and
from syndicated loans deals on profitability. A 1% increase in fee income per
total assets is associated with a 0.97% increase in return on assets. This ef-
fect size appears economically signifcant. Regarding syndicated loans, a 1%
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increase in volume per total assets is associated with a 0.055% increase in re-
turn on assets. This initially appears economically insignifcant because we
compare fee income and deal volumes. However, for a better comparison,
we can look at the effects of a 1 standard deviation increase of each
explanatory variable, as reported in table 4.2. A 1 standard deviation in-
crease in fee income (i.e. 0.7%) leads to an increase in proftability of
0.68%. A 1 standard deviation increase in syndicate loans deals (i.e. 5%)
amounts to an increase in proftability of 0.29%. Although the effect of
results 113
Table 4.7   Efects of individual business activities on profitability
Profitability
(22) (23) (24)
1st lag of regressand –0.335*** (0.063) –0.035 (0.062) –0.371*** (0.065)
2nd lag of regressand –0.124* (0.066) –0.092* (0.050) –0.346*** (0.125)
Fees 0.973*** (0.163) 0.602*** (0.128) 0.740*** (0.194)
Trading 0.022 (0.055) 0.170*** (0.054) 0.199** (0.089)
Debt –0.013 (0.017) –0.035 (0.026) –0.050* (0.028)
Equity –0.147* (0.088) –0.129 (0.082) –0.102 (0.249)
Syndicated loans 0.055** (0.025) 0.091** (0.046) 0.144** (0.057)
M&A 0.002 (0.004) –0.003 (0.003) –0.010 (0.008)
Asset management –0.001 (0.001) –0.001 (0.001) –0.003* (0.002)
Size 0.003** (0.001) 0.002* (0.001) 0.003* (0.002)
Leverage –0.0004*** (0.0001) –0.0003*** (0.0001) –0.0003*** (0.0001)
Economic growth 0.0017*** (0.0003) 0.0012*** (0.0002) 0.0016*** (0.0003)
Interest rate 0.0005 (0.0003) 0.0001 (0.0003) 0.0010** (0.0004)
Chi-squared 718*** 1168*** 557***
Number of instruments 90 90 48
Lag range of regressand 1–11 1–9 1–1
Collapsed Yes Yes Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–6
Collapsed Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–4 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.941 0.835 0.033
Hansen’s J-test 0.194 0.165 0.043
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.062 0.079 0.000
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.189 0.293 0.474
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
syndicated loans remains smaller than that of fees, the two effects are of a
roughly similar and economically signifcant magnitude.
We also observe evidence of positive effects from trading on profitability.
However, this effect is only observed in two out of three models. Further, we
observe non-robust and weakly signifcant negative effects from debt and
equity investment banking deals and from asset management on profitabil-
ity.
As previously discussed for the results on diversifcation indices, analysing
the effects on risk-adjusted profitability provides a consistency test for the es-
timated coefficients. Table 4.8 presents the effects from individual banking
activities on risk-adjusted profitability.
Consistent with the observed negative effects from fees on default risk and
positive effects on profitability, we observe signifcant and robust positive
effects on risk-adjusted profitability.
Equally, we fnd robust positive effects from trading on risk-adjusted profit-
ability. This increases the credibility of the previously reported non-robust
negative effects on default risk and positive effects on profitability. Further,
negative effects from equity deals on risk-adjusted profitability are observed
in column (19) but are non-robust in subsequent columns. However, this ef-
fect is consistent with the signs of the previously observed non-robust effects
on default risk and profitability. This adds to the credibility of this non-
robust evidence. Similarly, we see positive effects from syndicated loans busi-
ness on risk-adjusted profitability in column (20). This result is consistent
with the previously observed non-robust evidence of negative effects on de-
fault risk and the robust evidence of positive effects on profitability.
In contrast, previously observed non-robust negative effects from debt and
asset management business on profitability are not supported by correspond-
ing evidence on risk-adjusted profitability.
4.3.3 Control variables
The results for the control variables in tables 4.3 to 4.8 mostly have the
expected signs and otherwise yield insignifcant effects, the results on lever-
age being the exception. We observe no inconsistencies between signifcant
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effects on default risk, profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. Likewise,
models with different variables of interest are consistent with each other in
terms of signifcant results on control variables.
Size has a non-robust negative effect on default risk in only one model, in
column (4) in table 4.3. However, this observation is consistent with the pre-
dominantly positive effects on profitability and the mostly positive effects on
risk-adjusted profitability. In contrast to the models for diversifcation in-
dices, the models including individual banking activities only yield weakly
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Table 4.8   Efects of individual business activities on risk-adjusted profitability
Risk-adjusted profitability
(25) (26) (27)
1st lag of regressand –0.215*** (0.076) –0.069 (0.069) –0.609*** (0.075)
2nd lag of regressand 0.160 (0.129) –0.042 (0.063) 0.468*** (0.132)
Fees 0.436*** (0.143) 0.716*** (0.151) 0.735*** (0.141)
Trading 0.092** (0.038) 0.138*** (0.050) 0.211*** (0.078)
Debt 0.010 (0.011) –0.036 (0.026) –0.018 (0.028)
Equity –0.156* (0.083) –0.119 (0.083) –0.198 (0.218)
Syndicated loans 0.021 (0.015) 0.094** (0.046) 0.074 (0.047)
M&A –0.001 (0.004) –0.004 (0.006) –0.001 (0.007)
Asset management 0.000 (0.001) –0.001 (0.001) –0.001 (0.001)
Size 0.0007 (0.0007) 0.0016 (0.0010) 0.0014 (0.0011)
Leverage –0.0001 (0.0001) –0.0003*** (0.0001) –0.0003*** (0.0001)
Economic growth 0.0012*** (0.0002) 0.0012*** (0.0002) 0.0012*** (0.0002)
Interest rate 0.0004 (0.0003) –0.0001 (0.0003) –0.0004 (0.0004)
Chi-squared 634*** 992*** 890***
Number of instruments 88 91 48
Lag range of regressand 1–1 1–10 1–1
Collapsed No Yes Yes
Lag range of bank variables 2–5
Collapsed Yes
Lag range of pca scores 2–4 2–2
Collapsed Yes Yes
P-value AR(3) 0.272 0.673 0.038
Hansen’s J-test 0.222 0.162 0.170
Hansen’s C-test levels 0.087 0.124 0.020
Hansen’s C-test risk 0.147 0.380 0.366
All regressions include 799 observations over ninety banks. Year dummies are 
included. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Levels of significance 
at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by *, ** and ***.
Economies of scale 
for bigger banks
significant effects of size on profitability. These effects become insignifcant
when adjusted to risk. The effects of size on default risk are equally insigni-
fcant. These fndings can thus be regarded as limited evidence for a “too big
to fail” risk discount for larger banks and strong evidence of economies of
scale.
For leverage, we observe a signifcant negative effect on default risk, albeit
only in the models including individual banking activities. The effects from
leverage on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability are signifcantly neg-
ative in most models. A negative association of leverage with default risk and
a positive association with profitability and risk-adjusted profitability appear
counter-intuitive. For a possible explanation we must bear in mind that
profitability is defned as return on assets, not return on equity: After the
Global Financial Crisis, banks possibly compensated stricter regulatory
constraints on leverage by otherwise taking on more risk (Sarin and
Summers 2016). If banks keep their pre-crisis risk level to maintain the
return for equity holders, lower leverage and shorter balance sheets might
become correlated with higher return on assets.
Economic growth has a negative effect on default risk and positive effects
on profitability and risk-adjusted profitability. These effects are robust across
all models.
Interest rate yields non-robust negative signifcant effects on default risk
in the models for diversifcation indices. No signifcant effects are observed
for the models including individual banking activities. Interest rate effects
on profitability are mostly signifcant and positive across all models. The
effects on risk-adjusted profitability are signifcantly positive and robust
across all models that include diversifcation indices. However, for the mod-
els including individual banking activities we observe no signifcant effects.
The observed interest rate effects are overall consistent with our theoretical
expectations.
4.4 conclusion
The post-crisis policy debate on regulatory limits to banks’ trading and
investment banking activities stands on limited empirical grounds. Large
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banks are arguably the most relevant group of institutes for this debate.
However, existing studies on the effects of bank income diversifcation do
not focus on such banks but instead include more heterogeneous samples. It
is thus unclear to what extent existing fndings can be conferred to large
banks. In addition, existing studies cannot measure banks’ income structure
in great detail and the literature is in disagreement regarding the effects
of bank income diversifcation. This study therefore focuses on the effects
of income diversifcation on the performance of the largest international
banks, based on more detailed income structure data.
The data set includes ninety large listed international banks from 2005 to
2015. It provides information on the performance effects of general diversi-
fcation indices and of individual bank activities. In contrast to the existing
literature, the applied diversifcation indices do not assume equal shares of
different income types to constitute maximum diversifcation. Instead, the
indices used in this study assume the market portfolio of bank activities,
namely the average income structure, as the maximum level of diversifca-
tion. This allows incorporating more individual bank activities in the diversi-
fcation indices. Specifcally, I analyse the effects of investment banking and
asset management activities in greater detail than the existing literature.
The used data set combines information on fee and trading income with as-
sets under management and investment banking deal volumes. Assets under
management and volumes of debt, equity, syndicated loans and M&A deals
thereby serve as proxies for the related subtypes of fee income.
The results indicate that banks with a more diversifed income structure
generally have a lower default risk and a higher proftability. This fnding
holds for diversifcation between interest and non-interest income and for
diversifcation between various individual incomes including investment
banking activities and asset management.
The analysis of individual bank activities indicates that fee income out-
side investment banking and asset management (i.e. retail fees) reduces
banks’ default risk and increases their proftability. We also observe limited
evidence of negative effects on risk and positive effects on proftability from
diversifcation towards trading income and towards syndicated loans under-
writing. In contrast, we fnd equity underwriting to increase banks’ default
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risk and decrease their proftability and risk-adjusted proftability. For diver-
sifcation towards debt underwriting, M&A services and asset management,
we observe no conclusive effects on bank performance.
The results provide support for bank strategies aiming to increase the
share of non-interest income. Trading income and fee income from retail
banking and from syndicated loan underwriting appear preferable to in-
come from other investment banking activities and asset management. In
terms of policy implications, these fndings cast doubts on the effectiveness
of limiting large banks’ trading activities as a means to make these banks
more robust.
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Table 4.9   List of banks included
Agricultural Bank of China cn ctbc Financial Holding tw
Allied Irish Banks ie Danske Bank dk
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group au dbs Bank sg
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena it Deutsche Bank de
Banca Popolare di Milano it Deutsche Postbank de
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria es dnb no
Banco Bradesco br Erste Group at
Banco de Sabadell es Fifth Third Bancorp us
Banco do Brasil br Goldman Sachs us
Banco Santander es Hana Financial Group kr
Bank of America us hsbc gb
Bank of Beijing cn Huaxia Bank cn
Bank of China cn Industrial and Commercial Bank of China cn
Bank of Ireland ie Industrial Bank cn
Bank of New York Mellon us Industrial Bank of Korea kr
Bank of Shanghai cn ing nl
Bankia es Intesa Sanpaolo es
Barclays gb Itau Unibanco it
BB&T us JPMorgan Chase us
bnp Paribas fr kbc Bank be
CaixaBank es Lloyds Banking Group gb
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce ca Macquarie Group au
China Construction Bank cn Mitsubishi ufj Financial Group jp
China Everbright Bank cn Mizuho Financial Group jp
China Merchants Bank cn Morgan Stanley us
China Minsheng Banking Corporation cn National Australia Bank au
citic Group cn National Bank of Canada ca
Citigroup us Natixis fr
Commerzbank de Nordea se
Commonwealth Bank of Australia au Oversea-Chinese Banking Corporation sg
Crédit Agricole fr pnc Financial Services us
Credit Suisse ch Raifeisen Bank International at
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Table 4.9   (continued)
Regions Financial Corporation us Sumitomo Mitsui Trust Holdings jp
Resona Holdings jp SunTrust Banks us
Royal Bank of Canada ca Svenska Handelsbanken se
Royal Bank of Scotland gb Swedbank se
Sberbank of Russia ru Toronto-Dominion Bank ca
Scotiabank ca ubi Banca it
Shanghai Pudong Development Bank cn ubs ch
Shinhan Bank ko UniCredit it
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken se United Overseas Bank sg
Société Générale fr us Bancorp us
Standard Chartered gb vtb Bank ru
State Street us Wells Fargo us
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group jp Westpac Banking Corporation us
c h a p t e r  f i v e
5Overall Conclusion
The existing empirical literature is in discord over the desirability of bank
income diversifcation from a fnancial stability perspective. In light of the
recent and ongoing policy debate of separating commercial banking from
investment banking, the literature provides an unsatisfying basis for policy
decisions. This thesis offers several contributions to the empirical literature
by focusing on aspects that have so far been neglected.
In chapter 2, this thesis presents the literature’s frst categorization of
high-income countries as universal banking or specialized banking systems
over an extended period and reviews the historical political motives for in-
troducing such regulatory regimes. Based on the categorization as universal
banking or specialized banking systems, chapter 2 further assesses the rel-
evance of regulatory regimes as determinants of fnancial crises. Chapter 3
presents the frst meta-regression analysis on the micro literature on bank
diversifcation. The chapter illustrates the possibilities and limitations of
modern meta-regression techniques as an increasingly popular tool for eco-
nomics. Finally, chapter 4 analyses the effects of income diversifcation on
those fnancial institutions that are most relevant for the post-crisis regula-
tory debate: large international banks. This is the frst study in this feld to
focus on large international banks. The analysis includes more granular in-
come data than existing studies and measures bank income diversifcation
in greater detail. In addition, chapter 4 suggests a risk indicator and diversi-
fcation indices that are new to the literature on bank income diversifca-
tion.
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What can we learn from the results of this thesis? As previously discussed,
the post-crisis policy debate implicitly establishes the hypothesis that spe-
cialized banking is preferable to universal banking from a fnancial stability
perspective. The main result from this thesis is that evidence, overall, does
not support this hypothesis. However, not all results are fully consistent
across the three studies. Some results do speak in favour of specialized
banking systems: We observe more severe banking crises in universal bank-
ing systems and the meta-regression analysis indicates trading income to
be mostly associated with higher bank risk. Yet, the evidence in favour of
specialized banking in no way dominates. In contrast, the meta-regression
analysis indicates that larger banks are more likely than smaller banks to
increase risk-adjusted proftability when diversifying towards fee and trad-
ing income. Consistent with this fnding, the analysis of large international
banks fnds risk-reducing effects from diversifcation. On the macro level,
the evidence suggests that universal banking systems have a lower likeli-
hood of banking crises. Furthermore, the historic analysis shows that the
establishment of previous specialized banking systems around the world
was not primarily motivated by fnancial stability concerns.
Given the discord in the existing empirical literature, it would be quite a
surprise if the results of this thesis were unanimous. However, to justify a
regulatory separation of commercial banking from investment banking, we
would at least expect a clear overweight of evidence against universal bank-
ing. After all, such a regulation constitutes considerable interference with
freedom of commerce. In the absence of sufficiently clear evidence for the
social benefts of specialized banking, limitations to universal banking can-
not be justifed. The widely accepted idea that specialized banking systems
increase fnancial stability largely appears to be a perpetuation of a biased
belief without a convincing empirical basis.
This thesis furthermore shows that the empirical literature on bank diver-
sifcation uses a wide range of approaches. Future contributions to this feld
should be welcomed to develop a clearer set of commonly accepted research
designs. For instance, research should more closely analyse the relevance of
bank size as a precondition for successful bank diversifcation. Also, using
generalizing indices to measure diversifcation might only be helpful from a
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policy perspective. To produce results that are relevant for the management
of individual fnancial institutions, future studies should be based on more
detailed data on bank diversifcation.
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